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ABSTRACT 
 
The need for uniform financial information has brought about efforts to harmonise ac-
counting and audit regulation in the European Union. The European Commission has 
recommended that the EU member states should limit the civil liability of statutory 
auditors. It is argued that limiting auditors’ liability could lead to lower audit quality as 
a result of smaller liability risk. It is also argued that Big 4 auditors produce more con-
sistent audit quality than other auditors regardless of legal environment, meaning that 
limiting the liability affects the audit quality produced by Big 4 auditors less than other 
auditors. This study examines the effect of the existence of a liability cap for statutory 
auditors on audit quality measured by the magnitude of earnings management. Abnor-
mal working capital accruals are used for estimating earnings manipulation. The effect 
of a liability cap is also examined by comparing companies audited by Big 4 auditors to 
those that are not. The study examines the financial data from 2008 of 1,174 listed com-
panies in six European countries. The results of univariate and multivariate analyses 
provide no evidence that the existence of a liability cap affects audit quality as measured 
by the magnitude of earnings management or that this effect differs between companies 
audited by Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
KEYWORDS: accounting harmonisation, audit quality, audit regulation, auditor liabil-
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The academic interest in audit quality has augmented following major accounting scan-
dals, most particularly the Enron and Parmalat cases in the early 2000s. The Enron 
scandal led to the collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the largest audit partnerships in 
the world. This has brought about a general awareness of the fact that such collapses of 
major accounting companies are possible. Audit quality also is a key issue in interna-
tional trade. Auditing is facing major challenges associated with international markets 
as there are significant differences in audit regulation across countries. There is unani-
mous agreement that an international accounting harmonisation process is needed 
(López Combarros 2000: 644). There is need for more uniform financial information as 
wealth crosses national borders. The comparability of financial information regardless 
of its country of origin is important for financial markets. As accounting regulation in 
different countries is very heterogeneous at present, comparability poses a problem.  
 
The harmonisation process of accounting regulation in the European Union began in the 
1960s as part of its program of Company Law harmonisation. Since then the process has 
been underway, and harmonisation has been promoted through legal instruments such 
as Directives. (Gornik-Tomaszewski 2005: 70.) The harmonisation of audit regulation is 
an essential part of this harmonisation process. Statutory audit is currently regulated by 
the Audit Directive (2006/43/EC) accompanied by an amending directive (2008/30/EC). 
Auditor liability as a part of audit regulation is of particular current interest, as the 
European Commission has in 2008 given a recommendation concerning the limitation 
of the civil liability of statutory auditors and audit firms (2008/473/EC). In the docu-
ment the Commission recommends that member states of the European Union should 
take action to limit auditors’ liability. 
 
The effect of auditor’s liability on audit quality can be depicted with the concept of 
auditor’s client risk. For the auditor, there always is an element of risk included in audit 
engagements. Liability risk constitutes a part of an auditor’s client risk. The existence 
and the extent of liability affect client risk, which in turn causes the auditor to react ac-
cordingly. From a purely financial standpoint, liability risk can be seen as the expected 
value of damages to be paid. However, there are other aspects in the matter that need to 
be considered, for example the effect of possible litigation on the auditor’s reputation. It 
can be assumed that the auditor seeks to react to increased liability risk by increasing 
audit quality, thus lowering the probability of litigation and the expected value of dam-
  8 
ages to be paid. Figure 1 portrays the causal chain of how liability regime affects audit 
quality through liability risk. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The causal chain from liability regime to audit quality. 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of limiting statutory auditors’ liability 
on audit quality. However, audit quality cannot be measured directly, so a proxy meas-
ure has to be used. In this study the proxy measure used for audit quality is the magni-
tude of earnings management, i.e. the absolute value of discretionary accruals. At 
present auditors’ liability is limited in five member states of the European Union. In this 
study it is argued that the existence of a liability cap reduces auditors’ liability risk, 
which in turn might affect the quality of statutory audits. It is also argued that higher 
liability risk gives auditors extra incentive to produce higher quality audits, as auditors 
try to decrease the expected value of liability. Thus, an existence of a liability cap is 
expected to lead to lower audit quality compared to unlimited liability, leading to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Companies in EU member states where statutory auditors’ liability is limited by a 
liability cap report relatively higher absolute values of discretionary accruals compared 
to companies in EU member states where statutory auditors’ liability is not limited by a 
liability cap. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that Big 4 auditors produce more consistent audit quality com-
pared to non-Big 4 auditors regardless of legal environment. This is due to Big 4 audi-
tors’ bigger incentives for protecting their reputation (see e.g. DeAngelo 1981). In this 
study it is argued that Big 4 auditors are less affected by the existence of a liability cap 
than non-Big 4 auditors. In other words, the audit quality that Big 4 auditors produce 
under a regime of limited liability differs less from the quality they produce under 
unlimited liability compared to non-Big 4 auditors. The following hypothesis is con-
structed: 
Liability regime Liability risk Audit quality 
affects affects 
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H2: The magnitude of the absolute value of discretionary accruals is less affected by the 
existence of a liability cap in the case the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm 
compared to a non-Big 4 audit firm. 
 
This study contributes to the discussion on accounting and auditing harmonisation in 
Europe, particularly concerning limiting of auditors’ liability and its effect on audit 
quality. Six member states of the European Union are examined. Three of them have a 
liability cap: Belgium, Germany, and Greece. Three countries have a regime of unlim-
ited liability: Finland, France, and Sweden. 
 
The study is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, an overview of liability regulation in 
the European Union and the main features of the liability regimes in the six countries 
are presented. Chapter 3 explains the concept of liability risk and its role in how the 
liability regime presumably affects audit quality. Chapter 4 examines previous research 
on different factors affecting audit quality and the ways of measuring it. In Chapter 5 
the data is described as well as the statistical methods used for testing the hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results of the study. In Chapter 7, the results and their 
implications are discussed. 
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2. EUROPEAN LIABILITY REGIMES  
 
There is no one common legal system in the European Union. Each member country has 
its own regime and there are notable differences in the legal systems across member 
countries. Different commercial laws originate from the countries’ different legal tradi-
tions. Legal systems are based on either common law or civil law, which is divided 
further into three families: French, German, and Scandinavian civil law (La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1998: 1115). All six countries examined in this study 
have legal systems based on the civil law tradition. 
 
A country’s legal system and legal tradition affect the regulation concerning accounting 
and auditing in the country in question. In addition to legislation, there are differences 
in the extent to which accounting practice is determined by formal standards (Ball, 
Kothari & Robin 2000: 4). In the recent years financial scandals such as the Enron case 
has lead to changes in these corporate governance and auditing standards (Ojo 2008: 3–
4). 
 
Investor protection was an early rationale for audit regulation. This was based on the 
fact that investors do not have access to as much company information as directors and 
auditors. According to agency theory this creates a situation of information asymmetry. 
Audit regulation is needed to ensure the credibility of financial information given to 
investors (Eilifsen & Willekens 2008). The level of investor protection varies across 
countries. Legal systems based on civil law give investors weaker rights than common 
law systems, French civil law countries being the weakest and German and Scandina-
vian countries falling in between French civil law and common law systems (La Porta et 
al. 1998: 1116). In international transacting, a common law approach to accounting is 
prevalent (Ball et al. 2000: 47). Less earnings management has been detected in legal 
environments with stronger investor protection (Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki 2003). Thus, 
it could be claimed that presumably more earnings management occurs in French civil 
law countries than in German and Scandinavian regimes. 
 
In addition to regulation, the level of enforcement can be seen as an important element 
of the legal environment. According to Ball et al. (2000: 4), the efficiency of accounting 
standards depend on the level of public enforcement. The incentive to follow the stan-
dards varies across countries as it depends on penalties under different enforcement 
institutions. On the other hand, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006: 27–28) 
found in their study that criminal sanctions have no effect on the efficiency of security 
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laws. According to them, the effect is rather based on facilitating private contracting. 
Stronger legal enforcement also leads to less earnings management (Leuz et al. 2003).  
 
Statutory audit is at present regulated at the European Union level by two directives: 
(1) Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC, and 
(2) Directive 2008/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated ac-
counts, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 
The two directives do not regulate auditor liability in any way. The 2006 directive sim-
ply states that the member states’ liability regimes vary considerably, that unlimited 
liability may cause problems for auditors to obtain professional insurance, and that these 
matters will be investigated further. Article 31 of the directive in question states that a 
report will be published on the impact of national liability rules and, if appropriate, rec-
ommendations submitted to the member states. The mentioned report Consultation on 
auditors’ liability: Summary report was published in 2007. The European Commission 
published the Commission Recommendation concerning the limitation of the civil li-
ability of statutory auditors and audit firms 2008/473/EC in 2008.  
 
The main content of the Commission Recommendation 2008/473/EC is as follows: 
- The civil liability of statutory auditors and of audit firms arising from a breach 
of their professional duties should be limited expect in cases of intentional 
breach of duties; 
- The limitation should apply against the company audited and any third party; 
- The limitation should not prevent injured parties from being fairly compensated; 
- The use of any one or more of the following methods for limiting liability is rec-
ommended: 
a) A maximum financial amount of a formula allowing the calculation of such 
an amount; 
b) A set of principles by which a statutory auditor or audit firm is not liable be-
yond its actual contribution to the loss suffered and is not jointly and sever-
ally liable with other wrongdoers; 
c) Allowing the auditee and the auditor to limit liability contractually. 
 
As does audit regulation in general, regulation of auditor liability varies across coun-
tries. Ex ante regulation and ex post liability are two very different approaches to con-
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trol for activities (Eilifsen & Willekens 2008: 10). Also the basis for auditor liability is 
different from country to country. Firstly, liability can be based on special laws con-
cerning auditors, or the same civil liability laws as other professionals or the general 
public, or a combination of the two. Secondly, liability can be based on a contractual 
relationship between the auditor and the client, or it can be based on tort. Thirdly, there 
are liability caps in place in some countries, when in others they do not exist. (European 
Commission 2001.) Furthermore, in some countries liability can be limited contractu-
ally. 
 
Whether liability is based on contract or tort can have a significant impact on various 
issues. These include liability limitations, the amount and nature of recoverable dam-
ages, and the level of the auditor’s duty of care (European Commission 2001: 7). Dif-
ferent liability regimes may affect the behaviour of auditors and auditees differently and 
may result in alternative resource allocations, some of which might not be socially effi-
cient (Eilifsen & Willekens 2008: 11). 
 
Legal liability environment also is an important factor explaining audit fee variation 
across countries. The strictness of a country’s liability regime affects audit fees: the 
stricter the regime, the higher the fees (Choi, Kim, Liu & Simunic 2008: 56; Liu & 
Wang 2006: 1055). From the point of view of investor protection, higher auditor liabil-
ity raises the investor’s expected damage compensation and thus the value of the in-
vestment. This makes the investment opportunity more attractive and increases the 
probability of revealing worthless investment opportunities (Liu & Wang 2006: 1067). 
 
The implementation of auditors’ liability in the national laws is an important question 
regarding regulation harmonisation. If general rules of civil liability are applied to 
auditors, fundamental changes to the civil liability regimes, or the creation of specific 
rules, are needed. A regime of specific laws concerning auditors would make the har-
monisation process easier (European Commission 2001: 6). The European Commission 
has conducted consultations concerning whether a need to reform the auditor liability 
regime exists. Different options for a change have been presented; these will be dis-
cussed further in Section 2.2. As the EU is pursuing harmonisation of accounting and 
audit regulation, the Commission Recommendation (2008/473/EC) suggests various 
ways of liability limitation, as mentioned earlier. 
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Figure 2. Liability regulation in the causal chain from liability regime to audit quality. 
 
 
A country’s liability regime affects auditors’ liability risk, which in turn arguably has an 
effect on audit quality. Figure 2 presents the main features of a country’s liability re-
gime affecting liability risk as a part of this causal chain. 
 
 
2.1 Legal foundation of and the basis for auditors’ liability 
 
In any human activity there always is a possibility of damage occurring. The basic prin-
ciple is that the one facing with damage must suffer the damage. If a person can be 
shown to be liable for the damage as defined by law, this person has the obligation to 
compensate the damage he is liable over. Liability can be based on fault or negligence. 
(Hoppu & Hoppu 2004: 231.) Fault means negligent and intentional conduct (Köhler, 
Marten, Quick & Ruhnke 2008: 133). For example, an auditor’s fault or negligence can 
cause damage to the audited company. Depending on the degree and gravity of the fault 
or negligence and the applicable legislation the auditor may be liable for this damage. 
 
Liability in tort works through the effect of possible damage lawsuits after harm has 
occurred (Eilifsen & Willekens 2008: 11). Tort liability can be further divided into two 
categories: negligence liability and strict liability. Hoppu and Hoppu (2004: 232) define 
Liability regime 
 
- the legal foundation of 
auditors’ liability, i.e. 
is the liability based 
on tort or contract 
 
- the basis for auditors’ 
liability, i.e. the 
conditions leading to 
liability 
 
- the extent of auditors’ 
liability, i.e. is the 
liability limited or 
unlimited 
 
Liability  
risk 
Audit 
quality 
affects affects 
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negligence as careless conduct. By this definition a person is considered negligent if he 
fails to act to avoid harm as a reasonable person in his position would. Liu and Wang 
(2006: 1054–1055) define negligence as failure to exercise due diligence. They also 
state that strict liability can be viewed as a special case of negligence liability where an 
auditor is always judged negligent when a corporate failure occurs. It can be added that 
this includes cases where the auditor has been acting deliberately (Hoppu & Hoppu 
2004: 234). 
 
Liability can also be based on a contractual relationship between parties. Liability based 
on a breach of contract is called contractual liability, as opposed to liability in tort. 
Contractual liability may or may not be a result of negligent behaviour on the part of the 
liable party (Hoppu & Hoppu 2004: 245–246). 
 
Liability can reach beyond damages to the audited company. Individual shareholders 
and creditors among others may suffer damages because they use company information 
and the auditor’s report to make decisions (European Commission 2001: 7). Standards 
of liability as a means of investor protection are associated with larger stock markets 
(La Porta et al. 2006: 28). Liability to third parties is generally based on tort, since there 
is no contractual relationship between the auditor and the third party (European Com-
mission 2001: 8).  
 
Two fundamental questions concerning damages can be raised regardless of the legal 
foundation of liability (tort or contractual). First, the basis for liability, that is, what are 
the conditions that result in liability, and second, what is the extent of the liability, that 
is, what must a person pay or compensate when liable. (Hoppu & Hoppu 2004: 232.) 
Despite this study’s emphasis on the latter, differences between countries in the legal 
foundation and conditions leading to liability are also briefly discussed. 
 
 
2.2. Liability caps 
 
A liability cap is a means of limiting auditors’ liability by instituting a maximum 
amount for liability. In the European Union, the existence of a liability cap varies across 
countries and depends on the member states’ national regulation. Statutory liability caps 
are in use in some countries, while in others liability is not limited (European Commis-
sion 2001: 102). At present, five EU member countries have a liability cap: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, and Slovenia. There also exists a possibility for the auditor 
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and the audited company to limit liability contractually in some of the member states. 
The regulation concerning this is different between countries as well as the possibility 
of direct actions by shareholders or others (Doralt, Hellgardt, Hopt, Leyens, Roth & 
Zimmermann 2008: 63). There are different options for implementing a liability cap: (1) 
a fixed monetary cap, (2) a cap based on the size of the audited company, (3) a cap 
based on audit fees, and (4) the principle of proportionate liability (Ojo 2008: 4). 
 
According to Koch and Schunk (2008: 1) there are several goals which liability caps are 
meant to achieve. One goal mentioned also in the Audit Directive (2006/43/EC) is to 
ensure the insurability of audit services and thus their availability to clients. Other goals 
are reducing the risk of a Big 4 firm collapse and encouraging middle-sized audit firms 
to offer their services to listed clients. The Commission Recommendation 
(2008/473/EC) in theory extends liability caps to all member states, but in practice it 
does not require the member states to take action (Ojo 2008: 5). 
 
A study by London Economics (2006) proposes that auditors’ liability should be limited 
throughout Europe. The main reasons for this are: (1) the poor availability of auditor 
insurance especially for higher levels of liability, (2) the increased risk of litigation that 
would lead to a Big 4 firm collapse, and (3) the increased overall risk of the audit pro-
fession. The study does not recommend any particular form of liability cap, but con-
cludes that a relatively high cap is needed for Big 4 firms to promote audit quality, 
when at the same time middle-tier firms should be encouraged to audit larger firms by 
keeping the liability limit low enough. Liability should also be limited to keep audit fees 
reasonable, as increased liability leads to increased fees (Choi et al. 2008). A study by 
the Swedish justice department (SOU 2008: 79) points out that the company’s manage-
ment is responsible for financial reporting. Despite this, it is the auditor that is held li-
able for any damages due to negligence. Therefore, in practice liability actualises only 
on the auditor’s part. According to the Swedish study this is highly questionable and 
should be attended to by limiting auditors’ liability. 
 
There is also evidence prompting that auditors’ liability should not be limited. For ex-
ample, Doralt et al. (2008: 63) claim that limiting auditors’ liability protects auditors 
unfairly, as they are treated differently compared to other professions as lawyers or phy-
sicians. Köhler et al. (2008: 143) agree with this and add that a liability cap’s fairness 
can be questionable since the relative compensation for the loss suffered increases with 
the declining extent of damage. Ojo (2008: 3–4) states that in the case of negligence, the 
auditor should be held accountable for any consequences. From investor protection’s 
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point of view, higher auditor liability also raises investors’ expected damage compensa-
tion and thus the value of the investment (Liu and Wang 2006). In addition, according 
to Doralt et al. (2008: 63) a liability cap should never apply in the case of intentional 
wrongdoing from the part of the auditor. This is the case with the currently existing li-
ability caps in the EU, as they do not apply in case of intentional conduct (European 
Commission 2008: 77). Finally, unlimited liability can be seen as an incentive for better 
audit quality, as it would deter auditors who are not experienced in special kinds of au-
dit from performing such audits. It could also increase public confidence in the audit of 
financial statements. (Köhler et al. 2008: 143.) 
 
 
2.3. Liability regimes in different European countries 
 
Legal liability regimes vary across member states in the EU. There are differences in the 
way auditors’ liability is implemented in the legislation. Some countries have special 
laws concerning auditors; while in other countries general civil liability laws are applied 
to them. Furthermore, the basis for liability varies from contractual to tort. Liability 
caps restricting auditors’ liability are in use in some countries. 
 
Six countries were selected for this study. Three of them have no statutory liability caps: 
Finland, France, and Sweden. The three other countries have implemented a statutory 
liability cap: Belgium, Germany, and Greece. From legal system’s point of view, 
Finland and Sweden represent the Scandinavian civil law family, Germany and Greece 
are from the German civil law family, and Belgium and France have French civil law 
systems. Both Scandinavian and German civil law systems are considered to have a 
moderate level of investor protection, that is, weaker than common law countries and 
stronger than French civil law countries. Both the German and Scandinavian systems 
are also assumed to have a higher quality of law enforcement than French civil law 
countries (La Porta et al. 1998: 1116). The main characteristics of the liability regimes 
of the six countries are presented in Table 1 on page 19. 
 
2.3.1. Belgium 
 
The liability of statutory auditors in Belgium in regulated by the general rules of civil 
liability accompanied by the law of 23 December 2005. In Belgium a system of propor-
tional liability is in use, meaning that liability is placed upon defendants according to 
their contribution in the damage. Liability towards a client can be based on a contract or 
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tort, whereas the basis for liability towards third parties is tort. (European Commission 
2008: 74; Vanstraelen & Willekens 2008: 29.) 
 
Insurance for auditors covering liability is required in Belgium (London Economics 
2006: 94). Since 2006 (the law of 23 December 2005), there has been a liability cap per 
mandate, and its amount depends on whether the audited company is publicly listed or 
not. The cap for an audit of an unlisted company is three million euro, and twelve mil-
lion for an audit of a listed company (European Commission 2008: 77). There is a time 
limit of five years after the issue of the auditor’s report for bringing an action against the 
auditor (Vanstraelen & Willekens 2008: 29). 
 
2.3.2. Finland 
 
The liability of auditors is based on the Auditing Act § 51, which defines when the 
auditor is deemed liable. Other specific issues related to liability, e.g. calculation of 
damages, are regulated by general civil liability legislation. Auditor is only liable if 
negligence is shown (Niemi & Sundgren 2008: 91). This applies to both liability to the 
client and liability to third parties. Both the individual statutory auditor in charge of the 
audit and the audit firm are liable, as is the signing person. They are also liable for the 
damages caused by their employees. Associates may be liable for the breach of a gen-
eral provision of civil law. If the statutory auditor is an individual who works in an audit 
firm, the audit firm may be liable only in case of a breach of the contract. (European 
Commission 2001: 10.) 
 
The risk of litigation in Finland is relatively small, as is the number of complaints 
against auditors (Niemi & Sundgren 2008: 91).  No legal obligation for insurance cov-
ering liability exists (London Economics 2006: 94). There is no statutory liability cap in 
Finland. Contractual limitation to liability is possible in theory, but does not exist. There 
is a time limit for bringing an action against the auditor. The length of this limit depends 
on the plaintiff, and is three years if the plaintiff is the audited company, and ten years if 
the plaintiff is a third party. (European Commission 2001: 11.) 
 
2.3.3. France 
 
Statutory auditors’ liability is governed by a specific provision contained in Article 234 
of the Company Law of 24 July 1966. Liability can only be based on auditors’ “negli-
gent acts committed by them in the exercise of their functions”. (European Commission 
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2001: 11; Baker, Bédard & Prat dit Hauret 2008: 108.) This applies to liability towards 
the auditor’s clients as well as towards third parties. The auditor, either an individual or 
an audit firm, may be liable. In case of an audit firm, the signatory of the report is 
jointly and severally liable with the firm. The associates cannot be liable under the spe-
cific provision of the Company Law. (European Commission 2001: 11–12.) 
 
Auditors are required to have insurance for liability (London Economics 2006: 94). 
There is no statutory liability cap in France, and the parties cannot limit the amount of 
damages nor reduce the scope of auditor’s liability by contract. There is a time limit of 
three years from the occurrence of the damage for bringing an action against the auditor. 
(European Commission 2001: 12.) 
 
A distinctive feature of the French auditing system is the requirement of two auditors 
for companies with quoted shares. The two auditors are to be engaged in the auditing of 
the company’s accounts at the same time. (Baker et al. 2008: 99.) 
 
2.3.4. Germany 
 
In Germany, statutory auditors’ liability arises from specific statutory provisions as 
contained in Article 323 of the Handelsgesetzbuch, which provides for auditors’ con-
tractual liability. Auditors are also liable in tort, which is based on the general rules for 
civil liability. Some of the statutory provisions applicable to auditors’ liability are also 
found in the professional rules contained in the Act on the Profession of Auditors. Li-
ability to the audited company is based primarily on contract and secondarily in tort, 
and liability to third parties generally in tort. However, there is a possibility of contrac-
tual liability to third parties in the case of an implied contract between the auditor and 
the third party, or of a contract with protective effects towards the third party. Not only 
the statutory auditor but also all his assistants, as well as the statutory representatives of 
an auditing company, participating in the audit are directly liable to the injured party. 
(European Commission 2001: 12.) 
 
Insurance for auditors covering liability is required in Germany (London Economics 
2006: 95). There is a liability cap per audit or group audit, and its amount depends on 
whether the audited company is publicly listed or not. The cap for an audit of an 
unlisted company is one million euro, and four million for an audit of a listed company 
(European Commission 2008: 77). There are time limits for bringing an action against 
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the auditor. The limits are five years for an action in contract and three years for an ac-
tion in tort (European Commission 2001: 12). 
 
2.3.5. Greece 
 
Auditors’ liability in Greece is based on general civil liability and special legislation 
including the Codified Law 2190/20, which sets forth civil liability of auditors towards 
the company, and Article 19 of the Presidential Decree 226/1992, which contains spe-
cial provisions limiting auditors’ liability. The statutory auditor’s liability to the audited 
company arises in contract and to any third parties from a breach of duty in tort. The 
appointed statutory individual auditor or firm is liable for the damages that he as well as 
his associates caused. If the appointed auditor is a firm, the signatory of the report is 
jointly and severally liable with the firm. (European Commission 2001: 13.) 
 
Insurance covering auditor liability is required (London Economics 2006: 95). There is 
a liability cap of either the quintuple of the annual salary of the President of the Su-
preme Court or the total amount of fees received by the Chartered Auditor during the 
previous fiscal year, whichever is higher. The parties cannot limit the legal liability of 
the auditor by contract. There is a time limit for bringing an action against the auditor. If 
the plaintiff is the audited company, the limit is two years. If the plaintiff is a third 
party, the limit is five years. (European Commission 2001: 13.)  
 
2.3.6. Sweden 
 
Civil liability for statutory auditors in Sweden is specifically regulated in Chapter 15, 
Section 230 of the Swedish Companies Act, but a statutory auditor may also be liable 
under the general damage rules of the Tort Liability Act. The liability to the audited 
company is based on contract between the auditor and the client, and hence is contrac-
tual in nature. Liability to any third parties results from a breach of duty in tort. The 
auditor is also liable for the damages caused by the associates. (European Commission 
2001: 18.) 
 
Insurance or guarantee for auditors covering liability is required in Sweden (Kaisanlahti 
& Timonen 2006: 202; London Economics 2006: 96). There is no statutory liability cap, 
and the amount of damages or the scope of auditor’s liability cannot be limited by con-
tract. There is a time limit for bringing an action against the auditor. The length of this 
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limit depends on the plaintiff, and is five years if the plaintiff is the audited company, 
and ten years if the plaintiff is a third party. (European Commission 2001: 18.) 
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3. LIABILITY RISK 
 
As any type of business, auditing includes risks. Auditors’ risk associated with audit 
engagements includes different components. One of these components is liability risk. It 
consists firstly of the risk of an occurrence of an audit failure, and secondly the risk that 
the auditor would be found liable for the audit failure, which depends on the legal re-
gime. The economical aspect of liability risk is the expected value of damages the com-
pany has to pay. This value affects auditors’ decision making, which in turn is expected 
to affect audit quality. The decisions auditor make and actions they take correspond-
ingly affect the expected value of the damages. One important way to control the ex-
pected economical value of liability risk is insurance. The lack of availability of 
adequate insurance coverage poses a threat to individual auditors as well as audit com-
panies (e.g. London Economics 2006). Figure 3 presents the main features of auditors’ 
liability risk affected by a country’s liability regime and affecting audit quality as a part 
of the causal chain from liability regime to audit quality. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Liability risk in the causal chain from liability regime to audit quality. 
 
 
As one function of liability rules is to ensure that plaintiffs are reimbursed for damages 
caused by auditors (Gietzmann, Ncube & Selby 1997: 24), the existence of liability 
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leads logically to the conclusion that in the presence of a risk of an audit failure occur-
ring, there always is a risk that an auditor has to pay damages. An audit engagement 
never is without risk, as it is practically impossible for an auditor to reach full certainty 
that financial reports are free of material error. According to Liu and Wang (2006: 
1055), since audit procedures are not perfect in detecting error and an auditor’s effort is 
not easily observable, it is possible that, in practice, the court tends to judge an auditor 
with hindsight and conclude that an auditor did not perform enough audit procedures. 
 
 
3.1. Liability risk and decision making 
 
Liability risk affects the decisions auditors make regarding audit effort and client ac-
ceptance. The logical outcome of a higher risk would be that auditors expend audit ef-
fort to lower the probability of audit failure, thus achieving a smaller liability risk. This 
would lead to higher audit quality. Litigation risk is an important factor that motivates 
auditors to expend their effort in the performance of audits (Choi et al. 2008: 56). Ac-
cording to Gietzmann et al. (1997: 24) auditors’ incentives to commit to independence 
and high degree of care, i.e. produce high quality audits, could weaken if liability is less 
strict. Hence, the risk of litigation should lead to higher audit quality. Laux and New-
man (2010) have found that audit quality does increase with the auditor’s expected liti-
gation losses from audit failures. 
 
In his study, Heninger (2001) examines the relation between earnings management and 
auditor litigation. Auditor litigation increases with the extent to which client firms re-
port higher (i.e. income-increasing) abnormal accruals. This is because external stake-
holders hold auditors responsible for letting their clients to release false information 
about their financial situation. The study's results also indicate that litigation risk is 
greater for clients in weaker financial condition and for larger clients. 
 
Koch and Schunk (2008) studied how the extent of liability affects auditors’ decision 
making. Examining decisions under an environment of limited and unlimited liability, 
they found that unlimited liability has deterrence effects that can lead to an inefficiently 
high level of auditors’ effort, or even auditors stopping their activity entirely.  
 
Audit fees increase with the auditor’s expected litigation losses from audit failures 
(Laux & Newman 2010). As the fees grow with the risk, a country’s litigation environ-
ment plays a crucial role in audit pricing (Choi et al. 2008: 56). Expected losses must be 
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incorporated into audit fees because the fee cannot be adjusted retrospectively (Zerni 
2009: 21). Nevertheless, the risk may not be fully transferred to the audit fees charged 
from the client. A study by London Economics (2006) found that in the case of Big 4 
firms this is because of competition. A part of the risk premiums are also passed on to 
non-audit clients (London Economics 2006: 97). 
 
Client acceptance decisions are affected by litigation risk. When making these deci-
sions, auditors evaluate the client’s risk and the potential fee and determine whether the 
risk and return already are at an acceptable level. If the client’s risk and return are not 
acceptable, the auditor can consider whether additional audit investment or charging a 
higher fee would result in an acceptable risk and return rate. (Johnstone & Bedard 2003: 
1006.) It could be assumed that increased litigation risk would lead to higher client re-
jection rate, since the clients’ willingness to pay a higher audit fee would not compen-
sate for the high risk. Laux and Newman (2010) found that rising litigation risk can 
either increase or decrease the probability of client rejection. For both weak and strong 
legal liability regimes, rejection rates are high compared to more moderate legal liability 
regimes. 
 
Auditor switching becomes more costly when litigation risk increases, as the new audi-
tor wants to become familiar with the new client firm in greater detail. In countries with 
strict liability regimes, this leads to underpricing of auditing services in the initial audit 
engagement year as auditors compete for clients. (Kallunki, Sahlström & Zerni 2007.) 
 
 
3.2. Liability insurance 
 
Audit firms manage statutory audit risks by implementing internal risk management and 
by insurance (London Economics 2006: 91). An auditor can obtain insurance covering 
liability risks to bring the risk to a more reasonable level. The trust in auditors is not 
only based on the possibility to sue auditors for suffered economic losses, but also on a 
certain security that auditors are actually capable of paying for them (Holm & Warm-
ing-Rasmussen 2008: 70). Insurance is a way of not only ensuring the auditor’s ability 
to pay damages, but a way of communicating this ability to clients and third parties. 
 
In the case of an audit failure, an individual auditor and the management of the audit 
firm can be jointly liable for damages. In practice demands for compensation may be 
directed at the auditor alone, when the auditor is known to be insured (Andersson 2010: 
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61–62). At the same time, commercial insurers and reinsurers do not provide much 
cover, since insuring auditor liability is not a profitable business from their point of 
view (London Economics 2006: 112). This is mainly due to large losses sustained by 
the insurance industry in the underwriting of auditor professional insurance in the 
eighties and nineties (London Economics 2006: 116). 
 
The availability of insurance is important for ensuring the continuing supply for audit 
services. Auditing always contains an element or risk, and it is necessary for auditors to 
be able to perform in their risky profession. Liability risk normally rises as the auditee 
size grows. If the auditee is a large company, liability can reach large amounts. This 
affects auditors’ possibility to insure themselves by removing this possibility entirely or 
by extremely high insurance charges (Andersson 2010: 61–62).   
 
Insurance for liability is mandatory in most European Union member states. The avail-
ability for this legally required insurance for low level liability normally is not a prob-
lem. This has in many cases been taken care of by agreements between national auditor 
organisations and insurance companies. The availability of insurance poses a bigger 
problem with larger domestic and international risks. (London Economics 2006.) The 
requirements for insurance in the six countries of this study are presented in Table 2. 
 
Obtaining comprehensive insurance coverage for large liability risks is difficult. The 
availability of commercial insurance for large domestic and international risks has fallen 
sharply, and is now at a level which would cover less than five percent of the large 
claims some audit firms face. Insurance premiums have at the same time doubled for 
Big 4 companies during the first five years of the century. The difficult obtainability of 
insurance brings about the risk of audit firm collapse in the event that liability turns out 
to be too burdensome for the company to bear. The collapse of a Big 4 audit firm would 
lead to a situation where the audit market would be more centralised and arguably less 
competitive. This risk of a company collapse is growing with the reduction in commer-
cial insurance coverage combined with the risk that a case is pursued by a plaintiff in-
terested only in maximising recovery. (London Economics 2006: 115–116.) 
 
Auditor liability is not only designed to offer compensation for those suffering losses 
but also to act as an incentive to avoid professional malpractice. In other words, liability 
risk is meant to lead to better audit quality. For this reason it is reasonable that the 
auditor bears a part of the liability risk and that insurance does not cover liability com-
pletely (London Economics 2006: 100). If insurance would cover all of the risk, there 
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would be no incentive to produce better quality audits as the auditor would not bear a 
risk at all. 
 
 
Table 2. Mandatory insurance for audit firms (London Economics 2006: 94–96). 
 
Country 
Mandatory insurance required  
by law / others 
Minimum coverage 
Belgium By the professional association €619,733 per event 
Finland 
In practice, in Finland all auditors 
cover their work with voluntary 
insurance protection provided by 
the group insurance policy of the 
Authorised Public Accountants’ 
Institute 
- 
France By law €2,500,000 minimum per claim 
Germany By law 
Minimum coverage of €1 million for 
unlisted companies and €4 million for 
listed companies 
Greece By law 
Insurance must not be less than the 150% 
of the total fees which the Certified 
Auditors received in the previous financial 
year and in no case less than 10 times the 
total annual remuneration of the President 
of the Supreme Court 
Sweden By law 
Depends above all on the number of 
auditors in the practice. The amount varies 
between €440,000 per claim and up to 
€880,000 per claim or €2.65 million per 
year 
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4. AUDIT QUALITY 
 
The major accounting scandals in the beginning of the century have led to growing in-
terest on audit quality. These scandals have proven that poor quality can lead to disas-
trous consequences and has brought the matter’s importance to public knowledge. Audit 
quality is the basis for credibility of auditors and the audit industry as a whole. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Audit quality framework (Watkins et al. 2004: 155). 
 
 
Audit quality consists of two components: audit quality in fact and market perceived 
audit quality (Zerni 2009: 17). Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft (2004) presented an 
audit quality framework (see Figure 4) that divides audit quality into actual and per-
ceived quality, and used auditor monitoring strength and auditor reputation to depict 
these components. In the framework auditor monitoring strength includes two compo-
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nents: auditor competence and auditor independence. Competence refers to auditor 
finding existing material errors and independence to auditor reporting those errors (see 
e.g. DeAngelo 1981). Auditor reputation consists of perceived competence and per-
ceived independence. The framework also defines the products of audit quality as in-
formation quality and information credibility. The former refers to how well the audited 
financial statements reflect true economic circumstances and the latter to the degree of 
confidence a user of this information places in it. 
 
Audit quality has been the focus of several studies and the interest in the topic has 
grown especially after the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. The field of audit 
quality research has been reviewed comprehensively in articles by Francis (2004) and 
Watkins et al. (2004). The research has concentrated on different elements affecting 
audit quality, as legal environment (e.g. Ball et al. 2000; DeFond & Francis 2005; Fran-
cis & Wang 2004; Francis & Wang 2008; Heninger 2001; La Porta et al. 1998; Leuz et 
al. 2003; London Economics 2006; Maijoor & Vanstraelen 2006), auditor size (e.g. 
Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam 1998; DeAngelo 1981; Francis et al. 1999; 
Francis & Wang 2004; Francis & Wang 2008), audit effort (e.g. Caramanis & Lennox 
2008), and auditor independence (e.g. Chung & Kallapur 2003; Frankel, Johnson & 
Nelson 2002). 
 
Francis (2004) listed the most important findings of audit quality research so far. These 
findings are: 
- Auditing is relative inexpensive, less than 0.1 per cent of aggregate client sales; 
- Outright audit failures with material economic consequences are very infre-
quent; 
- Audit reports are informative, despite the presence of false positives and nega-
tives; 
- Audit quality is positively associated with earnings quality; 
- Audit quality is affected by legal regimes and the incentives they create; 
- There is evidence of differential audit quality by Big 4 firms and industry ex-
perts, and differential audit quality across individual offices of Big 4 firms and 
across different legal regimes; 
- Academic research has had little impact on regulations and policy-making in the 
US, although it may have had more influence in other countries such as the 
United Kingdom. 
(Francis 2004: 360.) 
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Figure 5. Audit quality in the causal chain from liability regime to audit quality. 
 
 
As the purpose of this study is to find out if the existence of a liability cap affects audit 
quality, the most interesting of the findings Francis (2004) listed is that audit quality is 
affected by legal regimes and the incentives they create. There is evidence of such an 
effect, and it can be assumed that there is a chance of a connection between limiting 
liability and audit quality. Another important finding is that audit quality is positively 
associated with earnings quality, as earnings quality is the proxy used for measuring 
audit quality in this study. Figure 5 presents audit quality as a part of the causal relation-
ship leading from liability regime to liability risk to audit quality. Auditor’s decision 
making links liability risk and audit quality together. Liability risk affects auditors’ de-
cisions concerning e.g. client acceptance and audit effort. These decisions affect the 
different components of audit quality. 
 
 
4.1. Measuring audit quality 
 
Audit quality is largely unobservable and difficult to measure. As audit working papers 
and the data generated in the audit process are usually not accessible for research pur-
poses, other ways to measure audit quality are needed. Typically this is done by using 
proxy measures. There are different proxies that have been used; European research has 
concentrated on audit fees, earnings management, and audit reporting. (Eilifsen & 
Willekens 2008: 3–4.) 
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In this study earnings management is used as the proxy measure for audit quality. 
Higher quality auditing leads to less earnings management. Managers have incentives to 
adjust earnings to maximise firm or manager wealth, which is due to contracts that have 
their outcome depend on reported earnings (Becker et al. 1998: 5–6).  There is evidence 
that earnings management is frequent in the case of earnings decreases or losses. In a 
study by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), evidence was found that 8–12 percent of the 
firms that had small pre-managed earnings decreases, managed earnings to report earn-
ings increases. In the case of negative pre-managed earnings, 30–44 percent of the firms 
exercised discretion to report positive earnings. 
 
Detection of earnings management is a key objective of an audit (London Economics 
2006: 156). Since earnings management is a factor that reduces the accuracy and thus 
the quality of financial reporting, it can be argued that better audit quality should reduce 
the amount of earnings management. High quality auditing acts as a deterrent to earn-
ings management because management's reputation is likely to be damaged and firm 
value reduced if misreporting is detected and revealed (Becker at al. 1998: 6). 
 
Earnings management is in practice conducted by manipulating accounting accruals. 
Accruals are temporary adjustments that resolve timing problems in cash flows by 
making assumptions and estimates, and their quality is defined as the extent to which 
accruals project into cash flow realisations (London Economics 2006: 156). Since man-
agers have limited ability to manipulate accruals attributable to normal business opera-
tions, any such earnings manipulations should manifest as abnormal accruals (Heninger 
2001: 124). In this study, earnings management is measured by the magnitude of dis-
cretionary accruals, and the concepts of abnormal and discretionary accruals are used 
interchangeably. 
 
 
4.2. Factors affecting audit quality and earnings management 
 
Earlier research has studied various factors affecting audit quality. These factors are 
presented in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1. Legal system 
 
In the European Union the existence of a liability cap is a matter of national regulation 
of the member states. Thus the legal system an auditor operates in is most relevant for 
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this study, especially regulation concerning auditor liability. However, there are other 
approaches to the question of legal system effect of audit quality besides limiting liabil-
ity. Some of these approaches and related earlier research are discussed in this section. 
 
One approach of interest has been the difference in audit quality between legal systems 
based on civil law and common law. Different legal traditions have given the national 
regulatory systems their contemporary form, including legislation concerning auditing. 
Since audit regulation depends partly on a country’s legal tradition, it is reasonable to 
assume that it affects audit quality. There is evidence that managers have greater discre-
tion in reporting earnings in code law countries than in common law countries (Ball et 
al. 2000: 3). The Big 4 auditors are more conservative, i.e. more restrictive concerning 
accruals reporting, in common law countries. The legal regime and investor protection 
environment seem to directly affect Big 4 auditor incentives. The conservatism varies 
across countries and is stronger in stronger investor protection environments. (Francis & 
Wang 2004.) These results are explained by the differences in the level of investor pro-
tection; higher levels of investor protection are usually associated with common law 
countries. In this study all six countries are civil law countries, two from each of the 
civil law subfamilies: French, German, and Scandinavian. Belgium and France have 
French civil law systems, Germany and Greece German civil law, and Finland and 
Sweden Scandinavian civil law tradition. The level of investor protection is considered 
to be average in German and Scandinavian systems, French civil law countries having 
the weakest protection (La Porta et al. 1998: 1116). 
 
In a study by Leuz et al. (2003) the results were that stronger investor protection leads 
to less earnings management. The factors the study found out to lower the amount of 
earnings management were strong minority shareholder rights and legal enforcement. 
These characteristics are typical for countries with high level of investor protection, 
dispersed ownership and large stock markets (Leuz et al. 2003). Francis and Wang 
(2008) argue that earnings quality varies across countries mainly due to differences in 
enforcement by Big 4 auditors. In countries with stronger investor protection, Big 4 
auditors apply a more conservative approach than in countries with weaker investor 
protection. There is no such difference in the case of non-Big 4 auditors. The incentives 
for Big 4 auditors seem to be affected by legal consequences on auditors from a failure 
to detect client misreporting (Francis & Wang 2008). 
 
The ability to sue auditors is one element of investor protection environment (Francis & 
Wang 2004: 22). This ability shows itself to auditors as litigation risk, thus increasing 
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the expected value of liability costs. Litigation risk is considerably lower in civil law 
countries when compared to common law countries due to differences in investor pro-
tection regimes. In his study, Heninger (2001) examines the relation between earnings 
management and auditor litigation. Auditor litigation increases with the extent to which 
client firms report higher (i.e. income-increasing) abnormal accruals. The study's results 
also indicate that litigation risk is greater for clients in weaker financial condition and 
for larger clients. 
 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) report evidence that the amount of earnings manage-
ment is not uniform across countries. They studied three European countries, namely 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These countries all have different legal 
environments and subsequently different levels of investor protection. France has a 
French civil law system, Germany represents the German civil law family, and the UK 
is a common law country. The results of the study were that a stricter audit environment 
reduces earnings management, as companies in countries with flexible audit quality 
regimes report significantly higher absolute values of discretionary accruals compared 
to companies in countries with strict audit quality regimes. Thus national differences in 
earnings management are dominant and are not removed by the presence of a Big 4 au-
dit firm. (Maijoor & Vanstraelen 2006.) These results support the findings of Francis 
and Wang (2004) on legal regime effect on Big 4 auditor conservatism. 
 
Limiting auditors’ liability was examined as a part of a study by London Economics 
(2006). The study found no evidence that the existence of a liability cap significantly 
affects audit quality as proxied by earnings management, i.e. accruals. The London 
Economics (2006) study ended up recommending a liability cap for reasons such as 
ensuring auditor insurability and the risk of an audit firm collapse. Results from a study 
by Koch and Schunk (2008) suggest that limiting liability affects auditors’ decision 
making, thus it could affect audit quality. 
 
A large selection of research confirms that legal environment really does affect audit 
quality. Differences in legal systems and regulation give auditors incentives to act dif-
ferently across legal regimes. Despite the evidence that legal system and regulation 
matters, the question of an optimal legal environment producing optimal audit quality 
remains unanswered (DeFond and Francis 2005: 13). 
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4.2.2. Auditor size 
 
Audit quality can be argued to vary from auditor to auditor. The effectiveness of audit-
ing is expected to vary with the quality of the auditor, as high quality auditors are more 
likely to detect errors and report them (Becker at al. 1998: 6). Big 4 auditors are often 
assumed to be of higher quality than other auditors. This assumption is supported by 
earlier research (e.g. Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). However, it is not conclu-
sive that the linkage is causal from auditor size to audit quality. Clients with better pre-
audit financial information quality may more likely choose Big 4 auditors, in which 
case selection bias may explain outcomes instead of audit quality (Zerni 2009: 18). If 
non-Big 4 auditors have clients with high levels of earnings management, they may be 
preventing a higher proportion of it than Big 4 auditors, thus detecting more errors and 
producing higher audit quality (Becker at al. 1998: 19).  
 
Big 4 auditors are often referred to being more conservative that non-Big 4 auditors. 
Auditor conservatism is a term used to describe the restraining effect of an auditor on 
clients’ accruals. It is a consequence of Big 4 firms having incentives to protect their 
brand name reputations. Clients are aware of this and try to convey the credibility of 
their reported earnings by hiring a more conservative auditor. (Francis et al. 1999: 17; 
Francis & Wang 2008: 1.) 
 
In summary, auditor size is widely assumed to affect audit quality, and there is empiri-
cal evidence to support this. If audit quality is defined to consist of actual and perceived 
quality, auditor credibility is an important factor. If Big 4 auditors are perceived to be 
more conservative and audits conducted by them more credible than other auditors, the 
perceived quality component of audit quality certainly is higher for Big 4 auditors. 
 
4.2.3. Other factors 
 
This section briefly discusses the factors affecting audit quality besides legal environ-
ment and auditor size. For example, audit effort and auditor independence directly affect 
the probability of an auditor detecting and reporting a problem, hence affecting audit 
quality (Caramanis & Lennox 2008: 116). 
 
Audit effort is a factor that implicitly affects audit quality, as it affects the probability 
that the auditor detects an existing problem. Audit effort can be measured by audit 
hours, i.e. the time the auditor uses for the audit. A study by Caramanis and Lennox 
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(2008) examined the effect of audit hours on reported earnings. They found out that 
audited companies report more income-increasing accruals when auditors work fewer 
hours. Lower audit hours lead to more income-increasing than income-decreasing ac-
cruals and higher likelihood of managing earnings upwards to just meet or beat zero 
earnings (Caramanis & Lennox 2008). Thus it can be argued that higher audit effort 
decreases earnings management. 
 
Auditor independence affects the probability that the auditor reports a detected problem 
(DeAngelo 1981). Higher level of independence arguably leads to higher audit quality. 
Non-audit fees are a factor claimed to compromise auditor independence (e.g. Chung & 
Kallapur 2003; Frankel et al. 2002). The evidence from these studies is controversial.  
 
According to Francis (2004), other factors affecting audit quality include cross-office 
quality differences, industry expertise, auditor tenure, audit committees, and accounting 
firm alumni. Research on cross-office quality differences is based on the presumption 
that the audit industry should rather be studied on the office level instead of national or 
international level. Industry expertise studies lean on the facts that Big 4 accounting 
firms actively promote their industry expertise and industry market shares are not 
evenly distributed among the large accounting firms. Audit tenure research is motivated 
by the requirement of auditor rotation. The effect of existence or independence of audit 
committees on audit quality is studied in audit committee research. Another line of re-
search investigates if accounting firm alumni in senior management positions of audit 
clients can potentially compromise audit quality. (Francis 2004: 354–358.) 
 
There exists research on yet other factors affecting audit quality than the ones men-
tioned here. An example of such is the study on how audit quality in initial public of-
ferings (IPO) differs from post-IPO audits by Venkataraman, Weber and Willenborg 
(2008). 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data collected for the study, the method for calculating discretionary accruals, and 
the univariate and multivariate methods used for testing the hypotheses are presented in 
this chapter. 
 
 
5.1. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
The data are collected from the Amadeus database, which contains data on over 15 mil-
lion companies in 43 countries across Europe. The countries selected for this study are 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and Sweden. Three of these countries, 
namely Belgium, Germany, and Greece, have limited statutory auditors’ liability by the 
means of a liability cap. The three other countries, Finland, France, and Sweden, have a 
regime of unlimited liability. The sample consists of listed companies with their finan-
cial year ending during the year 2008. 
 
To acquire the data needed for this study, a search from the Amadeus database was con-
ducted using suitable search criteria. The search included all listed companies in afore-
mentioned countries with available financial data from 2008, and data from 2007 
needed for analysis and calculating abnormal working capital accruals, which is the 
measure for earnings management in this study. Consistent with earlier research (Becker 
et al. 1998; Maijoor & Vanstraelen 2006), financial institutions (US SIC industry codes 
6000–6999) and utility companies (US SIC 4000–4999) were excluded from the search. 
This is due to these industries’ specific accounting requirements, high degree of com-
plexity, and different accrual generating process (Maijoor & Vanstraelen 2006: 37). 
 
The initial search returned 1,287 observations, of which 21 companies were missing the 
information on auditors, and further nine companies were missing a US SIC industry 
code. These 30 companies were excluded from the sample. The effect of outliers on the 
results was reduced by excluding all observations in the top and bottom 1% of all the 
continuous variables included in the regression model presented in Section 5.2.2.: ab-
normal working capital accruals scaled by sales, natural logarithm of total assets, ratio 
on long term debt and common equity, and operational cash flow scaled by total assets. 
Further 83 observations were removed from the sample for having outlier values, re-
sulting in final sample size of 1,174 companies in total. The number of observations by 
country is presented in Table 3 and is as follows: Belgium 53 companies, Finland 60,  
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Table 3. Sample size by country.  
 
Liability cap Country N % Cumulative % 
  Belgium 53 4.5 4.5 
Yes Germany 330 28.1 32.6 
  Greece 175 14.9 47.5 
 Total / Liability cap 558 47.5 47.5 
  Finland 60 5.1 52.6 
No France 367 31.3 83.9 
  Sweden 189 16.1 100.0 
  Total / No liability cap 616 52.5 100.0 
  Total 1,174 100.0   
 
 
Table 4. Sample size by industry.  
 
   US SIC industry codes*  
Liability cap Country SIC 01-09 SIC 10-17 SIC 20-39 SIC 50-59 SIC 70-89 
  Belgium 0 3 18 12 20 
Yes Germany 0 11 136 42 141 
  Greece 7 14 90 42 22 
  
Total / 
Liability cap 
7 28 244 96 183 
  Finland 0 2 34 5 19 
No France 2 13 142 57 153 
  Sweden 0 10 46 30 103 
  
Total / No 
liability cap 
2 25 222 92 275 
  Total 9 53 466 188 458 
 
* SIC 01–09: Agriculture, forestry and fishing; SIC 10–17: Mining & Construction; SIC 20–39: Manu-
facturing; SIC 50–59: Wholesale trade; SIC 70–89: Services 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the sample. 
 
    
Natural 
logarithm 
of total 
assets 
Earnings 
after tax  
/  
Total 
assets 
Operating 
cash flow 
/            
Total 
assets 
Long-term 
debt  
/               
Common 
equity 
Total 
accruals  
/                       
Lagged 
total 
assets 
Absolute 
value of                 
(Total 
accruals  
/  
Lagged 
total 
assets) 
                              
                              
Mean 11.009 -0.030 0.024 0.409 -0.041 0.105 
Median 10.915 0.022 0.052 0.186 -0.038 0.069 
Section 
A 
Pooled sample 
(N = 1,174) 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.905 0.207 0.183 0.654 0.159 0.126 
                              
                              
Mean 11.463 -0.022 0.030 0.494 -0.033 0.102 
Median 11.334 0.022 0.049 0.283 -0.039 0.065 
Section 
B 
Observations 
with a liability 
cap                    
(N = 558) 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.671 0.190 0.155 0.680 0.163 0.125 
                              
                              
Mean 10.598 -0.037 0.019 0.331 -0.048 0.103 
Median 10.459 0.022 0.055 0.123 -0.037 0.065 
Section 
C 
Observations 
without a 
liability cap      
(N = 616) 
Std. 
Deviation 
2.008 0.220 0.205 0.620 0.154 0.125 
                              
                              
t- 
statistic               
(p-value) 
-8.055 
(0.000) 
-1.309           
(0.191) 
-0.985           
(0.325) 
-4.285           
(0.000) 
-1.641           
(0.101) 
-0.677  
(0.499) 
Section 
D 
Tests of null* 
(B = C) Z-
statistic 
(p-value) 
-8.525 
(0.000) 
-0.321 
(0.748) 
-0.711 
(0.477) 
-6.220 
(0.000) 
-0.372 
(0.710) 
-1.035 
(0.300) 
 
* T-statistics are from t-tests of the differences in the means and Z-statistics from Mann Whitney U-tests. 
The tests are two-tailed. 
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France 367, Germany 330, Greece 175, and Sweden 189. Total number of observations 
is 558 from countries with a liability cap and 616 from countries without a liability cap. 
Table 4 presents the number of observations per industry and per country. 
 
Table 5 contains financial variables describing the sample. The pooled sample is pre-
sented in section A, and the samples from countries with and without a liability cap in 
sections B and C, respectively. The results of parametric and nonparametric tests com-
paring the two groups are found in section D. The variables presented in Table 5 are the 
following. Natural logarithm of total assets is a measure of company size, and earnings 
after tax scaled by total assets measures profitability. Operating cash flow is calculated 
by subtracting total accruals from earnings after tax and scaled by total assets as well. 
Long-term debt per common equity is used to measure leverage. The “direction” of total 
accruals and companies’ accruals-generating potential is measured by total accruals and 
their absolute value, both scaled with total assets. Following Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995), total accruals are calculated as (∆ current assets during the fiscal year - 
∆ cash) - (∆ current liabilities - ∆ short-term debt) - depreciation expense, where ∆ de-
notes change during the fiscal year. 
 
In general, companies from countries with a liability cap seem to be larger, slightly 
more profitable, and substantially more leveraged than companies from countries with 
unlimited auditor liability. Specifically, the natural logarithm of total assets and the ratio 
of long-term debt to common equity are significantly larger in the capped liability sam-
ple (p < 0.001). There are no statistically significant differences in the operational cash 
flows or direction of total accruals or the accrual-generating potential between the 
groups. 
 
In conclusion, there are differences between the samples with and without a liability cap 
with respect to size and leverage. These differences have to be taken into account in the 
construction of the model for multivariate tests by including control variables for size 
and leverage in the model. 
 
 
5.2. Research design 
 
In this study the proxy measure for audit quality is earnings management, which will be 
measured as the amount of abnormal accruals in audited financial statements. This re-
quires a means for estimating the discretionary component of reported income. The op-
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tions for this range from simple models in which discretionary accruals are measured as 
total accruals, to more sophisticated models that attempt to separate total accruals into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components (Dechow et al. 1995: 194). The most 
popular choices for estimating discretionary accruals are the Jones model (Jones 1991) 
and modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). However, they require either large 
time-series of observations or a large number of industry-specific observations (Maijoor 
& Vanstraelen 2006: 35). Thus, the Jones model and the modified Jones model are not 
suitable for the data used in this study, as it is cross-sectional and some industries have 
only a small number of observations. 
 
Following Defond and Park (2001) and Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) discretionary 
accruals will be measured as abnormal working capital accruals. Working capital accru-
als are seen as more susceptible to manipulation than non-working capital accruals 
(Maijoor & Vanstraelen 2006: 37). Discretionary accruals are calculated as: 
 
(1) DAt = WCt – [(WCt-1 / St-1) * St], 
 
where: 
DAt = discretionary accruals, i.e. abnormal working capital accruals in year t; 
WCt = non-cash working capital in year t calculated as (current assets - cash 
and cash equivalents) - (current liabilities - short-term debt); 
WCt-1 = non-cash working capital in year t-1; 
St = sales in year t; 
St-1 = sales in year t-1. 
 
The abnormal working capital accruals are then scaled by the sales of that year to ac-
quire the variable AWCA and its absolute value ABSAWCA used in the univariate and 
multivariate analyses. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of limiting auditors’ liability on audit 
quality. For this purpose, the magnitudes of earnings management in liability regimes 
with and without a liability cap are compared. The empirical analysis will focus on the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, as direction of the incentives to manage earn-
ings may vary across countries, as suggested by Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006: 39). 
The main company variables of interest in this study are: (1) whether the company is 
operating in a country with a regime of capped liability or unlimited liability; and (2) 
whether the company is audited by a Big 4 or a non-Big 4 audit firm. Univariate tests 
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presented in Section 5.2.2. are conducted to examine the effects of these variables on 
discretionary accruals. However, the primary emphasis of this study is on multivariate 
analysis. The method used for multivariate analysis is OLS regression, and the regres-
sion model presented in Section 5.2.2. is used to test the hypotheses. 
 
5.2.1. Univariate analysis 
 
A number of univariate tests are conducted to compare the magnitude of abnormal 
working capital accruals across the samples from regimes with and without a liability 
cap. First, the magnitude of absolute value of discretionary accruals, and second, the 
income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals are compared. Third, 
the effect of Big 4 auditor on the absolute value of discretionary accruals is examined. 
Fourth, the Big 4 auditor effect on income-increasing and income-decreasing discre-
tionary accruals is tested respectively. The analysis is conducted by comparing the 
means and medians of the samples using t-test and nonparametric tests. The tests are 
two-tailed. 
 
5.2.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
The model used in this study for multivariate analysis and its variables are, where appli-
cable, similar to the model used by Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) in their article on 
earnings management, audit environment, audit firm quality, and international capital 
markets. The model’s dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
The independent variables of interest in this study are the existence of a liability cap and 
the auditor type. In addition, consistent with previous studies and due to differences 
between the samples with and without a liability cap (see Table 5), control variables are 
included in the model. The regression model used is of the following form: 
 
(2) ABSAWCA = β 0 + β1LCAP + β2BIG4 + β3LNASSETS + β4GEAR + 
β5OPCF + β6INDi + ε, 
 
where: 
ABSAWCA = the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales; 
LCAP  = dummy variable for the existence of a liability cap (1 = liability cap, 0 = 
no liability cap); 
BIG4  = dummy variable for Big 4/non-Big 4 auditor (1 = company is audited by 
a Big 4 auditor, 0 = company is not audited by a Big 4 auditor); 
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LNASSETS  = control variable for company size, natural logarithm of total assets; 
GEAR  = control variable for gearing/leverage, the ratio of long-term debt and 
common equity; 
OPCF  = control variable for company performance, operational cash flow scaled 
by total assets; 
INDi = dummy variables for industries (SIC10-17: Mining & Construction; 
SIC20-39: Manufacturing; SIC50-59: Wholesale trade; SIC70-89: Ser-
vices). The industry of reference is SIC01-09: Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. 
 
The first company variable of interest in this study is whether the company is operating 
in a country with a regime of capped liability or unlimited liability. It is included in the 
model as the dummy variable LCAP, which gets the value 1 if the company is from a 
country which has adopted a liability cap, and value 0 if the company is from a country 
which has not adopted a liability cap. In other words, Belgian, German, and Greek 
companies get the value 1, and Finnish, French, and Swedish companies get the value 0. 
 
The second company variable of interest is whether the company is audited or not by a 
Big 4 auditor. The dummy variable BIG4 gets the value 1, if the company is audited by 
a Big 4 audit firm, and the value 0, if it is not audited by a Big 4 audit firm. 
 
Consistent with previous studies on earnings management, the following control vari-
ables are included in the model to control for earnings management incentives. First, the 
control variable LNASSETS for company size is included. Company size is proxied by 
the natural logarithm of total assets in the year in question. There is a substantial differ-
ence between the liability cap and unlimited liability samples with respect to company 
size. Larger companies are argued to prefer income-decreasing earnings management 
due to political costs (see Watts & Zimmermann 1990; Young 1999).  
 
Second, the control variable GEAR for leverage is included in the model. GEAR is cal-
culated as the ratio of long-term debt and common equity. The values of leverage differ 
significantly between the samples with and without a liability cap. Highly leveraged 
companies have incentives for income-increasing earning management because of debt 
covenants (e.g. Beatty & Weber 2003; Dichev & Skinner 2002). High leverage is also 
associated with financial distress, with distress leading to contractual renegotiations 
which provide incentives for income-decreasing earnings management (Becker et al. 
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1998: 17). The direction of the effect of leverage on discretionary accruals is therefore 
unclear. 
 
Third, OPCF is a variable controlling for company performance. Following Leuz et al. 
(2003) and Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), operational cash flow is calculated by sub-
tracting total accruals from net income after tax. The result is then scaled by total assets 
to obtain the value of the variable. Higher values of operational cash flow are expected 
to result in lower values of absolute discretionary accruals. 
 
Fourth, industry dummy variables are included in the model to control for industry ef-
fects on earnings management. Discretionary accruals are likely to vary by industry 
(Becker et al. 1998: 9). In the formal model (2) INDi denotes the following dummy 
variables: SIC10-17: Mining & Construction; SIC20-39: Manufacturing; SIC50-59: 
Wholesale trade; SIC70-89: Services. The industry of reference is SIC01-09: Agricul-
ture, forestry and fishing. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical results of the univariate and multivariate analyses used to test the hy-
potheses are presented in Sections 6.1. and 6.2. As stated in Chapter 5, the main vari-
ables of interest in the analyses are: (1) whether the company is operating in a country 
with a regime of capped liability or unlimited liability, and (2) whether the company is 
audited by a Big 4 or a non-Big 4 audit firm. Table 6 contains the Pearson correlation 
matrix of these variables accompanied by the control variables of the regression model. 
Furthermore, absolute value of working capital accruals scaled by sales and absolute 
value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets are found in the matrix. Table 6 shows 
that there is statistically significant correlation between several of the variables. How-
ever, the correlation coefficients are low, meaning the explanatory variables are not 
highly correlated. 
 
 
6.1. Univariate results 
 
Table 7 presents the univariate analysis of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by 
sales (AWCA). The mean and median values for the pooled sample are presented in 
section A. Sections B and C have the mean and median values for the samples from 
countries with and without a liability cap. Section D presents the differences between 
the mean and median values of sections B and C. Results of t-tests and nonparametric 
tests of these differences are also presented in section D. 
 
The mean of absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals reported by compa-
nies in the six countries of our pooled sample is 19.7% of sales, and the median 5.2% of 
sales. The first hypothesis of this study suggests that the absolute values of discretionary 
accruals reported by companies in countries with a liability cap should be higher than 
the absolute values of discretionary accruals reported by companies in countries without 
a liability cap. Companies in the three countries with a liability cap report mean abso-
lute discretionary accruals of 17.5% of sales, the median value being 5.2%. In the coun-
tries without a liability cap the mean of absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
21.7% of total accruals and the median 5.2%. Section D indicates that companies in 
countries with a liability cap report on average 4.2% lower absolute discretionary accru-
als the companies in countries without a liability cap. In the medians of absolute discre-
tionary accruals the difference is small, just 0.01%. The direction of the difference in 
the means is in the opposite direction than predicted by the hypothesis. Furthermore, 
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Variable definitions for Table 6 (page 45): 
ABSAWCA  = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals 
ABSTACC  = Absolute value of total accruals 
LCAP  = Dummy variable (company from country with a liability cap = 1, else = 0) 
BIG4  = Dummy variable (company audited by a Big 4 auditor = 1, else = 0) 
LNASSETS  = Natural logarithm of total assets 
GEAR  = Ratio of long-term debt to common equity 
OPCF  = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets 
SIC01-09  = Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 
SIC10-17  = Mining & Construction 
SIC20-39  = Manufacturing 
SIC50-59  = Wholesale trade 
SIC70-89  = Services 
 
 
neither one of the differences is statistically significant. This suggests that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the absolute value of discretionary accruals be-
tween the samples from countries with and without a liability cap. 
 
When examining the mean and median abnormal working capital accruals instead of the 
absolute value, the results still do not indicate statistically significant differences be-
tween the two samples. In the pooled sample mean discretionary accruals are 3.2% of 
sales, the median value being close to zero at -0.01%. Companies in the countries with a 
liability cap report mean discretionary accruals of 3.9%. The median reported discre-
tionary accruals are -0.4%. In the countries where auditors’ liability is not limited by a 
liability cap companies the mean reported discretionary accruals are 2.6%, and the me-
dian value is 0.4%. Section D indicates that companies in countries with a liability cap 
report on average 1.3% higher discretionary accruals than companies in countries with-
out a liability cap. The difference of medians is in the opposite direction; the median of 
the unlimited liability sample is 0.8% higher than the capped liability sample. The dif-
ferences are not statistically significant. 
  
Table 7 also presents univariate results separately for income-decreasing (negative) and 
income-increasing (positive) abnormal working capital accruals. The 588 companies 
reporting negative abnormal working capital accruals reported on average -16.5% of 
sales. Median accruals are -5.1%. In countries with capped liability there are 291 obser-
vations with negative AWCA, with a mean of -13.1% and a median of -5.4%. Respec-
tively, in countries with unlimited liability negative abnormal accruals are reported by 
297 companies; mean being -19.9% and median -5.0%. The average negative discre-
tionary accruals reported in countries without a liability cap are 6.8% larger than in 
countries with a cap. This difference is statistically significant (p = 0.047). 
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Table 7. Univariate results for discretionary accruals.  
 
    AWCA ABSAWCA 
AWCA < 0: 
income-
decreasing 
AWCA ≥ 0: 
income-
increasing 
       
         
 N 1,174 1,174 588 586 
A Mean 0.032 0.197 -0.165 0.229 
 
Pooled 
sample 
Median -0.0001 0.052 -0.051 0.052 
            
         
 N 558 558 291 267 
 
B 
Mean 0.039 0.175 -0.131 0.223 
 
Observations 
with  
a liability cap                    
Median -0.004 0.052 -0.054 0.051 
            
         
 N 616 616 297 319 
C Mean 0.026 0.217 -0.199 0.234 
 
Observations 
without  
a liability cap      
Median 0.004 0.052 -0.050 0.053 
             
          
Mean 
(p-value)* 
0.013 
(0.721) 
0.042 
(0.225) 
0.068 
(0.047) 
0.011 
(0.854) 
D 
Differences 
across 
samples 
B and C  
Median 
(p-value)* 
0.008 
(0.100) 
0.0001 
(0.900) 
0.004 
(0.550) 
0.003 
(0.448) 
 
* In section D the p-values for means are from t-tests and the p-values for medians from Mann-Whitney 
U-tests. The tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
The difference of medians is 0.4% in the opposite direction and is not statistically sig-
nificant. As to the income-increasing abnormal working capital accruals, there are 586 
companies reporting an average of 22.9% of sales in the pooled sample. The median is 
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5.2%. In the capped liability sample the mean is 22.3% and the median 5.1%. In the 
countries without a liability cap the mean is 23.4% and the median 5.3%. The unlimited 
liability sample has a mean that is 1.1% and a median that is 0.3% higher than the 
capped liability sample. The differences are not statistically significant. 
 
In conclusion, Table 7 indicates that the only difference statistically significant at the 
0.05 level between the samples is the 6.8 percentage points larger mean of income-de-
creasing abnormal working capital accruals in the sample without a liability cap. There 
also is a small difference between the medians of AWCA significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Although this study concentrates on the absolute value of abnormal accruals, negative 
and positive accruals are compared to find possible differences in their magnitudes. Ta-
ble 8 presents the univariate analysis of income-decreasing and income-increasing ab-
normal working capital accruals scaled by sales. In the pooled sample, there are 588 
companies reporting income-decreasing and 586 companies reporting income-increas-
ing accruals. The mean of negative accruals is -16.5% of sales and the median -5.1%. 
Respectively, the mean of positive accruals is 22.9%, the median being 5.2%. Mean 
absolute income-increasing discretionary accruals are 6.4% higher than absolute in-
come-decreasing accruals. The difference between the medians is 0.1%. The p-values 
for the differences (0.069 and 0.638) indicate that the difference between the means is 
significant at the 0.10 level and there is no statistically significant difference between 
the medians in the pooled sample. 
 
In countries with a liability cap the 291 companies reporting income-decreasing discre-
tionary accruals report mean accruals of -13.1% of sales. The median is -5.4%. The 267 
companies that report income-increasing accruals report on average 22.3% of sales, the 
median being 5.1%. The difference of means is 9.2%, the magnitude of income-in-
creasing accruals being larger, and the difference of medians 0.3% in the opposite di-
rection. The p-value for the means is 0.042, which indicates that the companies 
reporting positive abnormal working capital accruals in countries with a capped liability 
the magnitude of them is significantly larger than the magnitude of abnormal working 
capital accruals reported by companies that report income-decreasing accruals. Between 
the medians the difference is not statistically significant. In the sample of companies 
from unlimited liability regimes 297 companies report income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals, while 319 report income-increasing discretionary accruals. The mean of re-
ported negative accruals is -19.9% and the median -5.0% of sales. For positive reported 
accruals the mean is 23.4% and the median 5.3%. 
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Table 8. The magnitude of income-decreasing and income-increasing discretionary 
accruals. 
 
  Pooled sample Liability cap No liability cap 
  N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
           
AWCA < 0: 
income-decreasing 
588 -0.165 -0.051 291 -0.131 -0.054 297 -0.199 -0.050 
AWCA ≥ 0: 
income-increasing 
586 0.229 0.052 267 0.223 0.051 319 0.234 0.053 
Difference of 
absolute values 
(p-value)* 
 
0.064 
(0.069) 
0.001 
(0.638) 
 
0.092 
(0.042) 
0.003 
(0.706) 
 
0.036 
(0.506) 
0.004 
(0.314) 
                    
 
* The p-values for means are from t-tests and the p-values for medians from Mann-Whitney U-tests. The 
tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
Mean difference between negative and positive accruals is 3.6%, while the difference of 
the medians is 0.4%. The magnitude of positive accruals is higher according to both the 
difference in means and the difference in medians. However, with p-values of 0.506 and 
0.314 the differences are not statistically significant. 
 
In conclusion, t-tests indicate significant differences in the mean magnitudes of income-
decreasing and income-increasing abnormal working capital accruals in the pooled 
sample and the sample from the countries with a capped liability. However, the non-
parametric tests do not indicate any statistically significant differences between negative 
and positive AWCA. 
 
Univariate tests were also conducted to further examine negative and positive abnormal 
working capital accruals and the effect of auditor type (Big 4 or non-Big 4 audit firm) 
on them. The results are presented in Table 9, which indicates that regardless of the ex-
istence of a liability cap the mean and median abnormal working capital accruals are 
larger for the clients of non-Big 4 auditors than Big 4 auditors. This applies to absolute 
value of AWCA as well as income-decreasing and income-increasing accruals. In the 
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Table 9. Univariate results of discretionary accruals, differences between auditor types. 
 
  Pooled sample Liability cap No liability cap 
  N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
             
ABSAWCA            
Big 4 539 0.161 0.044 235 0.132 0.042 304 0.183 0.047 
Non-Big 4 635 0.228 0.062 323 0.206 0.062 312 0.250 0.062 
Difference 
(p-value)* 
 
0.067 
(0.053) 
0.017 
(0.001) 
 
0.075 
(0.071) 
0.020 
 (0.004) 
 
0.067 
(0.216) 
0.015 
(0.057) 
           
AWCA < 0: 
income-decreasing 
         
Big 4 263 -0.131 -0.043 123 -0.097 -0.043 140 -0.162 -0.044 
Non-Big 4 325 -0.192 -0.062 168 -0.155 -0.063 157 -0.231 -0.062 
Difference 
(p-value)* 
 
0.061 
(0.074) 
0.019 
(0.005) 
 
0.059 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
 
0.069 
(0.271) 
0.018 
(0.086) 
           
AWCA ≥ 0: 
income-increasing 
         
Big 4 276 0.189 0.046 112 0.170 0.041 164 0.201 0.050 
Non-Big 4 310 0.265 0.060 155 0.261 0.058 155 0.269 0.062 
Difference 
(p-value)* 
 
0.077 
(0.206) 
0.014 
(0.053) 
 
0.092 
(0.267) 
0.017 
(0.065) 
 
0.068 
(0.435) 
0.012 
(0.285) 
                    
 
* The p-values for means are from t-tests and the p-values for medians from Mann-Whitney U-tests. The 
tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
pooled sample the mean and the median absolute values of AWCA of non-Big 4 audi-
tors’ clients are 6.7% and 1.7% larger than those of clients of Big 4 auditors. The differ-
ences are significant at 0.10 and 0.01 levels (p = 0.053 and p = 0.001). In the case of 
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negative values of AWCA, the non-Big 4 accruals are 6.1% (mean) and 1.9% (median) 
larger than Big 4 accruals. These differences are also significant at 0.10 and 0.01 levels 
(p = 0.074 and p = 0.005). As to positive values of AWCA, the difference of means is 
7.7% (p = 0.206) and the difference of medians 1.4% (p = 0.053). 
 
In the liability cap sample the differences of absolute AWCA are 7.5% for the means (p 
= 0.071) and 2.0% for the medians (p = 0.004). Average negative accruals are 5.9% 
larger in the case of non-Big 4 auditors (p = 0.012), and the median difference is 2.1% 
(p = 0.019). Difference in positive accruals are 9.2% (means, p = 0.267) and 1.7% (me-
dians, p = 0.065). As to the countries without a liability cap, mean absolute AWCA is 
6.7% higher for non-Big 4 auditors (p = 0.216) and median 1.5% higher (p = 0.057). 
Negative accruals show differences of 6.9% (mean, p = 0.271) and 1.8% (median, p = 
0.086). Positive mean accruals are 6.8% (p = 0.435) and median accruals 1.2% (p = 
0.285) higher with non-Big 4 auditors. 
 
T-tests show that there are statistically significant (at least at the 0.10 level) differences 
in the means of absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals and negative 
AWCA in the pooled sample and the sample from countries with a liability cap. The 
nonparametric tests indicate that there are statistically significant differences in the ab-
solute value of AWCA and negative accruals in all the samples and in the positive 
AWCA in the pooled and liability cap samples. In conclusion, according to the results 
of the nonparametric tests, the magnitude of abnormal working capital accruals reported 
by clients of Big 4 auditors is significantly smaller than by clients of non-Big 4 auditors. 
This applies to the absolute value of AWCA and negative AWCA regardless of the ex-
istence of a liability cap, and to positive AWCA when liability is limited. This is con-
sistent with the assumption that Big 4 auditors generally produce higher audit quality 
than non-Big 4 auditors. 
 
Table 10 presents the results of univariate tests used to test the differences in AWCA 
under liability regimes of limited and unlimited liability separately for Big 4 and non- 
Big 4 auditors. The magnitude of abnormal working capital accruals seems to be gener-
ally larger under unlimited liability for both auditor types. However, the t-tests and non-
parametric tests conducted to test the differences indicate no statistical significance. 
 
The clients of Big 4 auditors report average absolute abnormal working capital accruals 
of 13.2% of sales under limited liability and 18.3% under limited liability. The result of 
the t-test indicates that this difference of 5.2% is not statistically significant. The median 
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accruals are 4.2% and 4.7% of sales, the latter being 0.5% larger. This difference is not 
statistically significant either. Respectively, the companies that are not audited by Big 4 
auditors report mean absolute AWCA of 20.6% under a regime of limited liability and 
25.0% under unlimited liability, the difference being 4.4% (p = 0.409) . The median 
absolute abnormal accruals scaled by sales are approximately 6.2% for both samples. 
 
 
Table 10. Univariate results of discretionary accruals, differences between samples by 
auditor type. 
 
 Liability cap No liability cap Difference 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Mean 
(p-value)* 
Median 
(p-value)* 
         
ABSAWCA         
Big 4 235 0.132 0.042 304 0.183 0.047 
0.052 
(0.226) 
0.005 
(0.422) 
Non-Big 4 323 0.206 0.062 312 0.250 0.062 
0.044 
(0.409) 
0.0003 
(0.787) 
         
AWCA < 0: 
income-decreasing 
        
Big 4 123 -0.097 -0.043 140 -0.162 -0.044 
0.065 
(0.124) 
0.001 
(0.259) 
Non-Big 4 168 -0.155 -0.063 157 -0.231 -0.062 
0.076 
(0.146) 
0.001 
(0.809) 
         
AWCA ≥ 0: 
income-increasing 
        
Big 4 112 0.170 0.041 164 0.201 0.050 
0.031 
(0.670) 
0.008 
(0.893) 
Non-Big 4 155 0.261 0.058 155 0.269 0.062 
0.008 
(0.934) 
0.004 
(0.564) 
         
 
* The p-values for means are from t-tests and the p-values for medians from Mann-Whitney U-tests. The 
tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
As to income-decreasing AWCA, the means for Big 4 auditors are -9.7% in the sample 
with a liability cap and -16.2% without a liability cap, the difference being 6.5%. The 
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medians are -4.3% and -4.4% and the difference 0.1%. For non-Big 4 auditors the corre-
sponding figures are means of -15.5% and -23.1% (difference of 7.6%) and medians of 
-6.3 and -6.2% (difference of 0.1%). The p-values of t-tests and nonparametric tests 
indicate that none of the differences are statistically significant. 
 
Income-increasing abnormal working capital accruals of clients of Big 4 auditors are on 
average 17.0% (median 4.1%) in countries with a liability cap and 20.1% (median 
5.0%) in countries with no liability cap. The difference is 3.1% (0.8%). The mean ab-
normal accruals of non-Big 4 audit clients are 26.1% (median 5.8%) and 26.9% (median 
6.2%), the difference being 0.8% (0.4%). None of the differences are statistically sig-
nificant. 
 
The second hypothesis of this study suggests that the magnitude of abnormal working 
capital accruals of clients of Big 4 auditors should be less affected by the existence of a 
liability cap than the abnormal working capital accruals of clients of non-Big 4 auditors. 
The results presented in Table 10 indicate no statistically significant differences what-
soever in the magnitude of income-decreasing or income-increasing abnormal accruals 
or the absolute value of AWCA. This indicates that the existence of a liability cap does 
not significantly affect the magnitude of abnormal working capital accruals of either 
auditor type.  
 
In conclusion, the univariate tests have given the following statistically significant (at 
least at the 0.05 level) results: 
- The mean income-decreasing abnormal working capital accruals in the sample 
without a liability cap is larger than in the sample with a liability cap; 
- The mean magnitude of income-increasing abnormal working capital accruals is 
larger than the mean magnitude of income-decreasing accruals in the pooled 
sample and the sample from the countries with a capped liability; 
- The mean magnitude of income-decreasing abnormal working capital accruals is 
lower for companies audited by Big 4 auditors when liability is capped; 
- The median absolute abnormal working capital accruals and income-decreasing 
abnormal accruals are lower for companies audited by Big 4 auditors in the 
pooled sample and in the sample with a liability cap. 
As for the hypotheses of this study, the univariate results provide no evidence support-
ing neither one of the two hypotheses. 
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The first hypothesis states that the absolute values of abnormal working capital accruals 
should be higher in the sample with a liability cap than in the unlimited liability sample. 
According to the t-tests and nonparametric tests there are no statistically significant dif-
ferences whatsoever in any direction in the absolute values of abnormal working capital 
accruals between the samples with and without a liability cap. Therefore the null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected. According to the second hypothesis the difference between 
the values of abnormal working capital accruals in the samples with and without a li-
ability cap should be smaller in the case of a Big 4 auditor than a non-Big 4 auditor. 
According to the t-tests and nonparametric tests there are no statistically significant dif-
ferences in the magnitude of abnormal accruals between the samples with and without a 
liability cap regardless of auditor type, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
 
6.2. Multivariate results 
 
The primary method of analysis in this study is OLS regression. The model used in the 
regression is presented in Chapter 5. The dependent variable in the model is 
ABSAWCA, which is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled 
by sales. The independent variables of interest are the first two dummy variables: the 
liability cap variable LCAP and the Big 4 auditor variable BIG4. There also are seven 
control variables in the model. 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the OLS regression for the pooled sample including all 
observations. The results show no significant difference in the magnitude of earnings 
management between countries with and without a liability cap in the sample. The esti-
mate for the variable LCAP is 0.005 with a significance value of p = 0.883. This is con-
sistent with the univariate results presented earlier. As for the variable BIG4, the 
estimate is 0.006 (p = 0.861), which indicates no significant effect of auditor type on 
earnings management. Although some differences of significance were found between 
the Big 4 and non-Big 4 samples in the univariate analysis, the regression results do not 
confirm this effect. 
 
The control variables LNASSETS, GEAR, and OPCF are all significant (p < 0.05) as 
expected. The control variable for company size (LNASSETS) gets an estimate of 
-0.048, which indicates that the magnitude of earnings management gets smaller as 
company size increases. The estimate for the control variable for leverage (GEAR) has a 
positive value of 0.066, which is consistent with earlier research (e.g. Beatty & Weber  
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Table 11. OLS regression results for pooled sample. 
 
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
    
Constant 0.675 3.036 0.002 
LCAP 0.005 0.147 0.883 
BIG4 0.006 0.175 0.861 
LNASSETS -0.048 -4.749 0.000 
GEAR 0.066 2.515 0.012 
OPCF -0.695 -7.309 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.227 1.090 0.276 
SIC20-39 -0.001 -0.005 0.996 
SIC50-59 -0.028 -0.143 0.887 
SIC70-89 0.086 0.438 0.661 
        
        
Adjusted R
2
 9.2%   
F-value 14.259  0.000 
N 1,174   
        
    
Variable definitions:    
LCAP = Dummy variable (company from country with a liability cap = 1, else = 0) 
BIG4 = Dummy variable (company audited by a Big 4 auditor = 1, else = 0) 
LNASSETS = Natural logarithm of total assets 
GEAR = Ratio of long-term debt to common equity 
OPCF = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets 
SIC10-17 = Mining & Construction 
SIC20-39 = Manufacturing 
SIC50-59 = Wholesale trade 
SIC70-89 = Services 
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2003; Becker et al. 1998; Dichev & Skinner 2002) as higher leverage leads to greater 
magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
 
The OPCF variable controlling for company performance gets an estimate of -0.695, 
which is negative as expected. Higher operational cash flows lead to less discretionary 
accruals, which is consistent with the results of e.g. Becker et al. (1998) and Maijoor 
and Vanstraelen (2006). 
 
The model has an adjusted R squared value of 9.2%, which is relatively low. However, 
low R squared values are not unusual for this kind of studies, as the purpose of the study 
is not to develop a model to explain earnings management but rather to examine the 
impact of the liability environment on it (e.g. Becker et al. 1998; Maijoor and Van-
straelen 2006). The adjusted R squared value is low in every regression in Tables 11–16 
varying between 3.8% and 13.2%. 
 
In conclusion, Table 11 indicates no evidence that the existence if a liability cap has a 
significant effect on the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals in the 
pooled sample. Thus there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that such an effect 
exists. As for the second hypothesis concerning the effect of a company being audited 
by a Big 4 auditor, no significant effect of auditor type on abnormal accruals is found in 
the pooled sample. 
 
In Table 12 the OLS regression results for samples with and without liability cap are 
presented separately. Consistent with the regression run on the pooled sample, the BIG4 
variable has no statistically significant impact on abnormal accruals in either sample. In 
the sample with a liability cap the only estimate with statistical significance is that of 
the OPCF variable. The value of the estimate is -1.017, being negative as expected. The 
regression for the sample without a liability cap has again three significant variables 
(estimate), LNASSETS (-0.069), GEAR (0.122), and OPCF (-0.492). The directions of 
the estimates remain the same as for the pooled sample. 
 
Table 13 presents the OLS regression results for samples with and without a Big 4 
auditor. The results indicate that the existence of a liability cap has no significant effect 
when examining the Big 4 and non-Big 4 samples separately. The second hypothesis of 
this study states that the effect of a liability cap on abnormal accruals is smaller in the 
case that a company is audited by a Big 4 auditor compared to a non-Big 4 auditor. As 
no significant effect is present in either one of the samples, no evidence supporting the  
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Table 12. OLS regression results for samples with and without a liability cap. 
 
Panel A: Liability cap sample   
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
Constant 0.483 1.975 0.049 
BIG4 -0.010 -0.217 0.828 
LNASSETS -0.019 -1.38 0.168 
GEAR 0.017 0.565 0.572 
OPCF -1.017 -7.578 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.261 1.281 0.201 
SIC20-39 -0.128 -0.690 0.491 
SIC50-59 -0.086 -0.454 0.650 
SIC70-89 -0.006 -0.033 0.974 
Adjusted R
2
 13.2%   
F-value 11.621  0.000 
N 558     
    
Panel B: No liability cap sample   
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
Constant 0.506 1.050 0.294 
BIG4 0.010 0.188 0.851 
LNASSETS -0.069 -4.804 0.000 
GEAR 0.122 2.879 0.004 
OPCF -0,492 -3.696 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.420 0.882 0.378 
SIC20-39 0.402 0.872 0.383 
SIC50-59 0.303 0.654 0.513 
SIC70-89 0.452 0.983 0.326 
Adjusted R
2
 8.6%     
F-value 8.218  0.000 
N 616     
    
For variable definitions, see Table 11.   
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Table 13. OLS regression results for samples with and without a Big 4 auditor. 
 
Panel A: Big 4 auditor sample   
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable* Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
Constant 0.487 3.350 0.001 
LCAP -0.008 -0.167 0.867 
LNASSETS -0.028 -2.247 0.025 
GEAR -0.013 -0.338 0.736 
OPCF -0.692 -5.449 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.334 3.054 0.002 
SIC50-59 -0.051 -0.713 0.476 
SIC70-89 0.053 1.088 0.277 
Adjusted R
2
 8.6%   
F-value 8.262  0.000 
N 539     
* SIC20-39 was removed from the model due to a tolerance value of 0.000  
    
Panel B: Non-Big 4 auditor sample   
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
Constant 0.877 3.156 0.002 
LCAP 0.010 0.182 0.856 
LNASSETS -0.069 -4.270 0.000 
GEAR 0.108 2.958 0.003 
OPCF -0.694 -5.039 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.154 0.638 0.523 
SIC20-39 -0.021 -0.099 0.922 
SIC50-59 -0.025 -0.112 0.911 
SIC70-89 0.104 0.479 0.632 
Adjusted R
2
 9.8%     
F-value 9.606  0.000 
N 635     
    
For variable definitions, see Table 11.   
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Table 14. OLS regression results for pooled sample with an independent variable for 
the combined effect of a liability cap and a Big 4 auditor. 
 
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
    
Constant 0.683 3.043 0.002 
LCAP -0.003 -0.063 0.950 
BIG4 -0.002 -0.035 0.972 
LCAP*BIG4 0.018 0.259 0.795 
LNASSETS -0.049 -4.755 0.000 
GEAR 0.067 2.527 0.012 
OPCF -0.695 -7.301 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.226 1.084 0.278 
SIC20-39 -0.003 -0.016 0.987 
SIC50-59 -0.030 -0.150 0.881 
SIC70-89 0.083 0.425 0.671 
        
        
Adjusted R
2
 9.2%   
F-value 12.829  0.000 
N 1,174   
        
    
Variable definitions:    
LCAP = Dummy variable (company from country with a liability cap = 1, else = 0) 
BIG4 = Dummy variable (company audited by a Big 4 auditor = 1, else = 0) 
LCAP*BIG4 = Dummy variable (company from a country with a liability cap and audited by a Big 4 
auditor = 1, else = 0) 
LNASSETS = Natural logarithm of total assets 
GEAR = Ratio of long-term debt to common equity 
OPCF = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets 
SIC10-17 = Mining & Construction 
SIC20-39 = Manufacturing 
SIC50-59 = Wholesale trade 
SIC70-89 = Services 
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hypothesis is obtained from the regression. In the Big 4 auditor sample the company 
size control variable LNASSETS and company performance control variable OPCF get 
statistically significant estimates of -0.028 and -0.692. In the non-Big 4 auditor sample 
the estimates are -0.069 and -0.694, respectively. The leverage variable GEAR also is 
statistically significant in the non-Big 4 sample with an estimate of positive value 
(0.108). The estimates of all of the three variables remain in the same direction as in the 
pooled sample regression. 
 
Finally, an interaction variable LCAP*BIG4 was introduced to the model to take into 
account the possible effect of the combination of an existing liability cap and a Big 4 
auditor. The regression results with this variable are presented in Table 14. The addition 
of the interaction variable does not change the results, as the only statistically signifi-
cant variables in the regression remain to be LNASSETS, GEAR, and OPCF. Accord-
ing to the results the combined effect of a liability cap and a Big 4 auditor is not 
statistically significant. 
 
To conclude the results from the multivariate analysis conducted by OLS regression, the 
limiting of auditors’ liability by a liability cap has no significant effect on the magnitude 
of earnings management as measured by the absolute value of abnormal working capital 
accruals. This is consistent with the results of the univariate analysis presented in Sec-
tion 6.1. Therefore, there is no evidence supporting the first hypothesis of this study, 
and the null hypothesis stands. These results are consistent with earlier research finding 
no evidence of such an effect, such as the London Economics (2006) study. As for the 
second hypothesis, the regression analysis does not provide evidence supporting the 
assumption that the effect of the existence of a liability cap is smaller in the sample of 
companies audited by Big 4 auditors compared to the sample of companies not audited 
by Big 4 auditors. These results are also consistent with the univariate results, and the 
null hypothesis stands in this case as well. 
 
 
6.3. Sensitivity analyses 
 
To test the robustness of the results, the following sensitivity analyses have been per-
formed. First, another measure of earnings management is used in the regression model. 
Following Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006), total accruals are used as an alternative 
earnings management measure. Total accruals are calculated following Dechow et al. 
(1995) as (change in current assets during the fiscal year - change in cash) - (change in  
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Table 15. OLS regression results for pooled sample with absolute value of total 
accruals as the dependent variable. 
 
Dependent variable: ABSTACC = Absolute value of total accruals 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
    
Constant 0.260 5.457 0.000 
LCAP 0.017 2.251 0.025 
BIG4 -0.006 -0.733 0.464 
LNASSETS -0.013 -5.853 0.000 
GEAR -0.004 -0.740 0.460 
OPCF 0.019 0.912 0.362 
SIC10-17 0.015 0.344 0.731 
SIC20-39 -0.025 -0.595 0.552 
SIC50-59 -0.027 -0.636 0.525 
SIC70-89 -0.013 -0.307 0.759 
        
        
Adjusted R
2
 3.8%   
F-value 6.088  0.000 
N 1,174   
        
    
Variable definitions:    
LCAP = Dummy variable (company from country with a liability cap = 1, else = 0) 
BIG4 = Dummy variable (company audited by a Big 4 auditor = 1, else = 0) 
LNASSETS = Natural logarithm of total assets 
GEAR = Ratio of long-term debt to common equity 
OPCF = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets 
SIC10-17 = Mining & Construction 
SIC20-39 = Manufacturing 
SIC50-59 = Wholesale trade 
SIC70-89 = Services 
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current liabilities - change in short-term debt) - depreciation expense, and then scaled by 
total assets from previous fiscal year. Table 15 presents the OLS regression results with 
total accruals as the dependent variable. Second, OLS regression is run without obser-
vations from France to remove the possible effects of French observations on the re-
sults. French legislation demands publicly traded companies to appoint two auditors, 
who are both engaged in auditing the company at the same time (Baker et al. 2008: 99).  
Table 16 presents the results of the OLS regression without French companies and with 
abnormal working capital accruals as the dependent variable. 
 
When using total accruals scaled by lagged total assets as the dependent variable, the 
results of the OLS regression differ from those obtained earlier. Table 15 indicates that 
the LCAP variable is statistically significant (p = 0.025) and when auditors’ liability is 
limited by a liability cap, total accruals are higher than in the case of unlimited liability. 
The absolute value of total accruals is 1.7% of the sales higher with a liability cap than 
without it. This indicates that the existence of a liability cap increases the magnitude of 
earnings management as measured by total accruals in the pooled sample, as predicted 
by the first hypothesis. Thus the univariate and multivariate results finding no signifi-
cant effect of the existence of a liability cap or a Big 4 auditor presented previously may 
be dependent on the method used for measuring discretionary accruals and earnings 
management. To further examine the effect of the selected measure on the results com-
pared to other measures, a more comprehensive analysis using alternative methods of 
measuring earnings management would be needed. 
 
When observations from France are removed from the regression model, the statistically 
significant variables remain the same as in the pooled sample regression, as do their 
direction. Parameter estimates for these variables LNASSETS, GEAR, and OPCF are 
-0.050 (pooled sample -0.048), 0.089 (0.066), and -0.865 (-0.695). The regression with-
out French companies was also run separately for the Big 4 auditor and non-Big4 audi-
tor samples. The LCAP variable did not turn out to be statistically significant in this 
regression either. The results of this regression are not reported. 
 
   62 
Table 16. OLS regression results without observations from France. 
 
Dependent variable: ABSAWCA = Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by sales 
Independent variable Parameter estimate t-value Significance 
    
Constant 0.857 3.005 0.003 
LCAP -0.058 -1.057 0.291 
BIG4 -0.007 -0.126 0.899 
LNASSETS -0.050 -3.526 0.000 
GEAR 0.089 2.684 0.007 
OPCF -0.865 -7.020 0.000 
SIC10-17 0.154 0.590 0.556 
SIC20-39 -0.099 -0.406 0.685 
SIC50-59 -0.118 -0.475 0.635 
SIC70-89 -0.016 -0.066 0.947 
        
        
Adjusted R
2
 11.8%   
F-value 12.930  0.000 
N 807   
        
    
Variable definitions:    
LCAP = Dummy variable (company from country with a liability cap = 1, else = 0) 
BIG4 = Dummy variable (company audited by a Big 4 auditor = 1, else = 0) 
LNASSETS = Natural logarithm of total assets 
GEAR = Ratio of long-term debt to common equity 
OPCF = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets 
SIC10-17 = Mining & Construction 
SIC20-39 = Manufacturing 
SIC50-59 = Wholesale trade 
SIC70-89 = Services 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of limiting auditors’ liability by a 
liability cap on audit quality. It was also studied whether auditor size affects this effect. 
Samples consisting of company observations from countries with and without a liability 
cap were compared.  
 
The results of this study provide no evidence that the existence of a liability cap affects 
audit quality as measured by the magnitude of earnings management. This is consistent 
with earlier research finding no such effect (e.g. London Economics 2006). In light of 
these research results, the European Commission’s recommendation that auditors’ li-
ability should be limited in all EU member countries does not involve a threat to audit 
quality, and the introduction of liability limitation, at least by means of a liability cap, 
should be a step towards harmonisation of accounting and audit regulation, that does not 
lead to lower quality audits. Rather it could be argued to promote audit quality through 
better insurability, availability of audit services, and competition in the audit market.  
 
As for auditor size and audit quality produced by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, no evi-
dence of an effect of liability caps on audit quality was found. Despite this, Big 4 audi-
tors were found to produce higher audit quality (i.e. less earnings management) than 
non-Big 4 auditors. 
 
However, the conducted sensitivity analyses indicate that the aforementioned results 
could be dependent on the used earnings management measure. In this study earnings 
management was measured as abnormal working capital accruals. The limitations of 
working capital accruals as earnings management measure have been acknowledged 
earlier (see e.g. Maijoor & Vanstraelen 2006: 51). By changing the measure to total 
accruals, the results of the OLS regression change essentially. This should be taken into 
account when assessing the results of this study. 
 
The following limitations of this study should also be considered. As always with stud-
ies comparing several countries, it is possible that underlying factors other than those 
already taken into account either cause differences in results between countries or di-
minish them. The effects of earnings management incentives such as company size, 
leverage and performance have been taken into account by controlling for them, but 
there may be many other incentives that are not considered. Finally, as the data consists 
of financial information for only one year (fiscal years ending in 2008), and just five 
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countries out of twenty-seven in the European Union have introduced an auditors’ li-
ability cap at the moment, the sample examined in this study was relatively small in 
size. 
 
As for future research, the statutory audit is not a matter that only concerns listed com-
panies. The examination of the effect of limiting auditors’ liability on audit quality 
should be widened to unlisted companies as well.  
 
 
   65 
REFERENCES 
 
Andersson, E. (2010). Reform of the auditing system – Administrator’s report. MEE 
Publications, Competitiveness 1/2010. Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. 
 
Baker, C.R., J. Bédard & C. Prat dit Hauret (2008). The regulatory response in France 
to accounting scandals. In: Auditing, Trust and Governance: Developing 
Regulation in Europe, 98–110. Ed. R. Quick, S. Turley & M. Willekens. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Ball, R., S.P. Kothari & A. Robin (2000). The effect of international institutional factors 
on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 
1–51. 
 
Beatty, A. & J. Weber (2003). The Effects of Debt Contracting on Voluntary 
Accounting Method Changes. The Accounting Review 78:1, 119–142. 
 
Becker, C.L., M.L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo & K.R. Subramanyam (1998). The Effect of 
Audit Quality on Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research 
15:1, 1–24. 
 
Burgstahler, D. & I. Dichev (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases 
and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 99–126. 
 
Caramanis, C. & C. Lennox (2008). Audit effort and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 45:1, 116–138. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.05.002 
 
Choi, J.-H., J.-B. Kim, X. Liu & D.A. Simunic (2008). Audit Pricing, Legal Liability 
Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 25:1, 55–99. doi:10.1506/car.25.1.2 
 
Chung, H. & S. Kallapur (2003). Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal 
Accruals. The Accounting Review 78:4, 931–955. 
 
DeAngelo, L.E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 3:3, 183–199. doi:10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1 
   66 
Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan & A.P. Sweeney (1995). Detecting earnings management. 
The Accounting Review 70:2, 193–225. 
 
DeFond, M.L. & J.R. Francis (2005). Audit Research after Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory 24, 5–30. 
 
DeFond, M.L. & C.W. Park (2001). The Reversal of Abnormal Accruals and the Market 
Valuation of Earnings Surprises. The Accounting Review 76:3, 375–404. 
 
Dichev, I.D. & D.J. Skinner (2002). Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant 
Hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 40:4, 1091–1123. 
 
Doralt, W., A. Hellgardt, K.J. Hopt, P.C. Leyens, M. Roth & R. Zimmermann (2008). 
Auditors’ Liability and its Impact on the European Financial Markets. 
Cambridge Law Journal 67:1, 62–68. 
  
Eilifsen, A. & M. Willekens (2008). In the name of trust: some thoughts about trust, 
audit quality and audit regulation in Europe. In: Auditing, Trust and Governance: 
Developing Regulation in Europe, 1–18. Ed. R. Quick, S. Turley & M. 
Willekens. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
European Commission (2001). A study on systems of civil liability of statutory auditors 
in the context of a Single Market for auditing services in the European Union. 
Available from World Wide Web: <URL:http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market 
/auditing/docs/liability/auditliability_en.pdf>. 
 
European Commission (2008). Accompanying document to the Commission Recom-
mendation concerning the limitation of the civil liability of statutory auditors and 
audit firms: Impact assessment. Commission staff working document. Available 
from World Wide Web: <URL:http://ec.europa.eu 
/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/impact_assessment_en.pdf >. 
 
Francis, J.R. (2004). What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting 
Review 36:4, 345–368. 
 
   67 
Francis, J.R., E.L. Maydew & H.C. Sparks (1999). The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the 
Credible Reporting of Accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 
18:2, 17–34. 
 
Francis, J.R. & D. Wang (2004). Investor protection and auditor conservatism: are Big 
4 auditors conservative only in the United States? Working Paper. University of 
Missouri and University of Nebraska. Available from World Wide Web: 
<URL:http://pdfcast.org/download 
/investor-protection-auditor-conservatism-and-earnings-quality-are-big-4-
auditors-conservative-only-in-the-united-states.pdf>. 
 
Francis, J.R., & D. Wang (2008). The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 
Audits on Earnings Quality around the World. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 25:1, 157–191. 
 
Frankel, R.M., M.F. Johnson & K.K. Nelson (2002). The Relation between Auditors' 
Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 
77:4 Supplement, 71–105. 
 
Gietzmann, M.B., M. Ncube & M.J.P. Selby (1997). Auditor Performance, Implicit 
Guarantees, and the Valuation of Legal Liability. International Journal of 
Auditing 1:1, 13–30. 
 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, S. (2005). Antecedents and expected outcomes of the new 
accounting regulation in the European Union. Research in Accounting 
Regulation 18, 69–103. 
 
Heninger, W.G. (2001). The Association between Auditor Litigation and Abnormal 
Accruals. The Accounting Review 76:1, 111–126. 
 
Holm, C. & B. Warming-Rasmussen (2008). An account of accountants: Audit 
regulation and the audit profession in Denmark. In: Auditing, Trust and 
Governance: Developing Regulation in Europe, 42–77. Ed. R. Quick, S. Turley 
& M. Willekens. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Hoppu, E. & K. Hoppu (2004). Kauppa- ja varallisuusoikeuden pääpiirteet. 2. ed. 
Helsinki: WSOYpro. 
   68 
Johnstone, K.M. & J.C. Bedard (2003). Risk management in client acceptance 
decisions. The Accounting Review 78:4, 1003–1025. 
 
Jones, J.J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29:2, 193–228. 
 
Kaisanlahti, T. & P. Timonen (2006) Tilintarkastajan vahingonkorvausvastuu – 
kehitystarpeet de lege ferenda. Ministry of Trade and Industry. Available from 
World Wide Web: <URL:http://julkaisurekisteri.ktm.fi/ktm_jur/ktmjur.nsf/All 
/23CE98544CC0A2E2C2257248002B615F/$file/jul39elo_2006_netti.pdf>. 
 
Kallunki, J., P. Sahlström & M. Zerni (2007). Propensity to Switch Auditors and 
Strictness of Legal Liability Environment: The Role of Audit Mispricing. 
International Journal of Auditing 11:3, 165–185. 
doi:10.1111/j.1099-1123.2007.00363.x 
 
Koch, C. & D. Schunk (2008). Limiting Auditors’ Liability? – Experimental Evidence 
on Behavior under Risk and Ambiguity. Working Paper. University of Mannheim 
and University of Zurich. Available from World Wide Web: 
<URL:http://aaahq.org/meetings/AUD2009/LimitingAuditorsLiability.pdf> 
 
Köhler, A.G., K.-U. Marten, R. Quick & K. Ruhnke (2008). Audit regulation in 
Germany: Improvements driven by internationalization. In: Auditing, Trust and 
Governance: Developing Regulation in Europe, 111–143. Ed. R. Quick, S. 
Turley & M. Willekens. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes & A. Shleifer (2006). What works in securities law? 
The Journal of Finance 61:1, 1–32. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny (1998). Law and finance. 
Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155. 
 
Laux, V. & D.P. Newman (2010). Auditor liability and client acceptance decisions. The 
Accounting Review 85:1, 261–285. 
 
   69 
Leuz, C., D. Nanda & P.D. Wysocki (2003). Earnings management and investor 
protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 
505–527. 
 
Liu, C. & T. Wang (2006). Auditor liability and business investment. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 23:4, 1051–1071. doi:10.1506/E023-337T-180P-18U4 
 
London Economics (2006). Study on the Economic Impact of Auditors’ Liability 
Regimes (MARKT/2005/24/F): Final Report To EC-DG Internal Market and 
Services. Saatavana World Wide Webistä: <URL:http://ec.europa.eu 
/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditors-final-report_en.pdf>. 
 
López Combarros, J.L. (2000). Accounting and financial audit harmonization in the 
European Union. The European Accounting Review 9:4, 643–654. 
doi:10.1080/09638180020024034 
 
Maijoor, S.J. & A. Vanstraelen (2006). Earnings management within Europe: the effects 
of member state audit environment, audit firm quality and international capital 
markets. Accounting and Business Research 36:1, 33–52. 
 
Niemi, L. & S. Sundgren (2008). Developments in auditing regulation in Finland: From 
a national to an international framework. In: Auditing, Trust and Governance: 
Developing Regulation in Europe, 78–97. Ed. R. Quick, S. Turley & M. 
Willekens. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Ojo, M. (2008). Proposals for a new audit liability regime in Europe. Unpublished. 
Available from World Wide Web: <URL:http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de 
/10068/1/MPRA_paper_10068.pdf> 
 
SOU 2008:79. Revisorers skadeståndsansvar. Stockholm: Justitiedepartementet, 2008. 
Available from World Wide Web: <URL:http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/10025 
/a/111106> 
 
Vanstraelen, A. & M. Willekens (2008). Audit regulation in Belgium: Overregulation in 
a limited capital market oriented country? In: Auditing, Trust and Governance: 
Developing Regulation in Europe, 19–41. Ed. R. Quick, S. Turley & M. 
Willekens. Abingdon: Routledge. 
   70 
Venkataraman, R., J.P. Weber & M. Willenborg (2008). Litigation Risk, Audit Quality, 
and Audit Fees: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings. The Accounting Review 
83, 1315–1345. doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.5.1315 
 
Watkins, A.L., W. Hillison, S.E. Morecroft (2004). Audit quality: A synthesis of theory 
and empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting Literature 23, 153–193.  
 
Watts, R.L. & J.L. Zimmerman (1990). Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year 
Perspective. The Accounting Review 65:1, 131–156. 
 
Young, S. (1999). Systematic Measurement Error in the Estimation of Discretionary 
Accruals: An Evaluation of Alternative Modelling Procedures. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting 26:7/8, 833–862. 
 
Zerni, M. (2009). Essays on audit quality. Oulu: University of Oulu, Faculty of 
Economics and Business Administration, 2009. Available from World Wide 
Web: <URL:http://herkules.oulu.fi/isbn9789514292927 
/isbn9789514292927.pdf> 
 
 
 
 
